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COPYRIGHTING COPYWRONGS: AN EMPIRICAL
ANALYSIS OF ERRORS WITH AUTOMATED DMCA
TAKEDOWN NOTICES
By Daniel Seng1
Under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA),
reporters issuing takedown notices are required to identify the
infringed work and the infringing material and provide their contact
information (functional formalities), attest to the accuracy of such
information and their authority to act on behalf of the copyright owner,
and sign the notices (non-functional formalities). Online service
providers will evaluate such notices for compliance with these DMCA
formalities before acting on them. This paper seeks to answer questions
about the quality of takedown notices, especially those generated by
automated systems, which are increasingly being used by copyright
owners to detect instances of online infringement and issue takedown
notices on their behalf. After parsing three million takedown notices
and more than eighty million takedown complaints served on Google
between 2011 and 2015, this paper analyzes each notice for errors.
This paper finds that almost all notices comply with the non-functional
formalities. However, at least 5.5% of all takedown notices between
1
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2011 and 2015 fail to comply with the functional formalities in that
they are missing copyright work descriptions. In addition, at least 9.8%
of the takedown notices exhibit have empty takedown requests,
misidentify the infringing site or provide inactive URIs as takedown
requests. To ensure that the takedown system remains fast, efficient and
error-free, this paper proposes to strengthen the attestation
requirements of notices, to require reporters to validate all submitted
takedown complaints and requests, and to subject recalcitrant
reporters to the “slow lane” of a two-tier system for processing
takedown notices. This methodology reflects the use of accountability
metrics in the design of automated systems and suggests a verifiable
response to address concerns pertaining to the use of systems that
supplant human decision making.
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INTRODUCTION
When the Council of the European Union approved the
Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market on 17 April 2019,2
it was supposed to represent the latest updates to European copyright
laws for the new digital age.3 Instead, the application of the Copyright
Directive is now in doubt: Poland has filed a legal challenge with the
European Court of Justice and argued that its takedown-and-stay-down
notice rule—Article 17 of the Copyright Directive4—undermined the
“essence of the right to freedom of expression and information and
[did] not comply with the requirement that limitations imposed on that
right be proportional and necessary.”5 The action by Poland reflects
much of the controversy and intense lobbying activity in Europe that
preceded the controversial passage of the Copyright Directive.6 Indeed,
it mirrors the online blackout in January 2012 that stemmed from
concerns over how the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) and the
PROTECT IP Act (PIPA) introduced in the U.S. Congress would
threaten free speech and innovation,7 concerns similar to those raised

2

Directive (EU) 2019/790 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
17 April 2019 on copyright and related rights in the Digital Single Market and
amending Directives 96/9/EC and 2001/29/EC, 2019 O.J. (L 130) 1, 1
[hereinafter Copyright Directive].
3
Id. recital 83.
4
Id. art. 17 (extending the existing takedown mechanism to a “takedown and
staydown mechanism.”); id. recital 66. (“Additionally, such online contentsharing service providers should also be liable if they fail to demonstrate that
they have made their best efforts to prevent the future uploading of specific
unauthorised works, based on relevant and necessary information provided by
rightholders for that purpose.”).
5
Case C-401/19, Republic of Poland v. Council, 2019 O.J. (C 270).
6
See, e.g., EU Copyright Reform – What's so Controversial, ABA (May
2019),
https://www.americanbar.org/news/abanews/publications/youraba/2019/may
-2019/eu-copyright-reform--whats-so-controversial-/.
7
The Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) was a U.S. bill introduced in the House
of Representatives with the goal of expanding the legal remedies available to
content providers against Internet intermediaries to combat online copyright
infringement. This included enabling the U.S. Attorney General to seek a court
order to require “a service provider (to) take technically feasible and
reasonable measures designed to prevent access by its subscribers located
within the United States to the foreign infringing site.” H.R. 3261, 112th Cong.
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concerning Article 17 of the Copyright Directive.8 Bowing to these
concerns, the U.S. Congress shelved SOPA and PIPA,9 and retained
the status quo in U.S. copyright law that is the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (DMCA).10 Conversely, by passing Article 17 of the
Copyright Directive, subject to the challenge from Poland, the
Europeans succeeded in changing their existing copyright laws on
intermediary liability that were largely based on the DMCA.11 What
was the underlying motivation for this unprecedented legislative
reform of the DMCA?
In a nutshell, the DMCA, which was enacted in 1998,
established the notice and takedown mechanism as part of an overall
scheme to protect online service providers from fiscal liability for
copyright infringement from their provision of services.12 Under this
notice and takedown mechanism, copyright owners will report
instances of copyright infringement to the online service providers via
takedown notices.13 And service providers, who are under no general

§ 102(c)(2)(A)(i) (2011). [Herein after Stop Online Piracy Act]. The Senate
version of SOPA was the Protect IP Act (Preventing Real Online Threats to
Economic Creativity and Theft of Intellectual Property Act or PIPA). S. 968,
112th Cong. (2011). Concerns were raised that provisions such as these in
SOPA and PIPA would enable law enforcement to block access to entire
domains and lead to Internet censorship. This led to a coordinated effort by
numerous Internet intermediaries to blackout their services on Jan. 18, 2012,
in protest of these bills. See e.g. Amy Goodman, The Sopa Blackout Protest
GUARDIAN
(Jan
18,
2012),
Makes
History,
THE
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cifamerica/2012/jan/18/sopablackout-protest-makes-history.
8
Case C-401/19, Republic of Poland v. Council, 2019 O.J. (C 270),
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=216823&p
ageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=193214
52.
9
Stop Online Piracy Act, supra note 7. Plans to draft their alternative, the
Online Protection & Enforcement of Digital Trade Act (OPEN), were also
shelved in the U.S.
10
Id.
11
See, e.g., Miguel Peguera, The DMCA Safe Harbors and Their European
Counterparts: A Comparative Analysis of Some Common Problems, 32
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 481 (2009).
12
See Senate Report 105-190: The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998,
at 20.
13
See id. at 45.
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obligation to monitor their services,14 are to respond by taking down
the allegedly infringing content referred to in the takedown notice.15
Copyright owners have taken the stand that the online service providers
are not doing enough under the takedown mechanism to fight copyright
infringement.16 Some owners have described the takedown mechanism
as being ineffective by contending that for every takedown notice that
they send to disable an infringing resource, multiple copies of that
resource which the online service provider has taken down will
surface—the so-called “whack-a-mole” problem.17 Indeed, using the
number of notices issued as an indicator of the scale of the problem of
copyright infringement, copyright owners have exponentially
increased the number of takedown notices they have issued across the
years, from 125 thousand in 2011 to 1.31 million in 2015, which
represents a year-on-year increase of 79.8% in notices each year.18
Interestingly, in 2012, copyright owners ramped up their DMCA
takedown notices by an astounding 88% after SOPA and PIPA failed.19

14
17 U.S.C. § 512(m)(1); Copyright Directive, supra note 2, art. 8; Directive
2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on
certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic
commerce, in the Internal Market 2000 O.J. (L 178) 1, 13 [hereinafter ECommerce Directive].
15
In this paper, the term “notice” is used to refer to the legal document
addressed by the complainant to the receiving organization such as an online
service provider or an individual. The term used in 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) is
“notification.” Google's Copyright Transparency Report rather confusingly
refers to these notices as “requests,” whereas Twitter's Transparency Report
(correctly) refers to them as “notices.” Google Search Removals Due to
Copyright Infringement FAQs, GOOGLE (2020), http://www.google.com/
transparencyreport/removals/copyright/faq/
#what_is_a_copyright_removal_request.
16
See Brad Buckles, Some Clear Facts About Google's “Transparency”
Report, RECORDING INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA (May 30, 2012),
https://www.benton.org/headlines/some-clear-facts-about-googlestransparency-report.
17
Section 512 Study: Notice and Request for Public Comment, 80 Fed. Reg.
81862 (Dec. 31, 2015),
https://www.copyright.gov/fedreg/2015/80fr81862.pdf [hereinafter Section
512 Study].
18
See infra Table 1.
19
Daniel Seng, The State of the Discordant Union: An Empirical Analysis of
DMCA Takedown Notices, 18 VA. J.L. & TECH. 369, 390 (2013) [hereinafter
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Using the number of takedown requests20 as a proxy for enforcement
action on the other hand shows that since 2011, there is an
extraordinary year-on-year increase of 249% in requests each year.21 If
each takedown request represents a targeted unlicensed online
resource, this means that the number of online resources targeted for
takedowns has more than doubled each year. And on the basis that there
are around 50 billion individually indexed web pages in the world in
2015,22 assuming that there are no duplicate takedown requests, this
means that in 2015, 565 million or at least 1.13% of web pages
worldwide are alleged to contain unlicensed online resources.23 This is
an extraordinary statistic that represents the sheer scale and intensity of
the enforcement action on the Internet.

The State of the Discordant Union]; see also Mike Masnick, Funny How
Copyright Holders Only Ramped Up Google DMCA Takedowns After SOPA
Failed, TECHDIRT (Dec. 13, 2012),
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20121212/22445321369/funny-howcopyright-holders-only-ramped-up-google-dmca-takedowns-after-sopafailed.shtml.
20
This paper uses the term “requests” to refer to the “information reasonably
sufficient to permit the service provider to locate the material” in 17 U.S.C. §
512(c)(3)(A)(iii). Google’s Transparency Report somewhat confusingly also
refers to these as “URLs requested to be removed” and “search results
specified in requests.” See Google Search Removals Due to Copyright
Infringement FAQs, supra note 15. This paper also uses the term “complaints”
to refer to each complaint of infringement of copyright works for the same
copyright owner or licensee, submitted in a single notice. For a further
discussion, see Seng, supra note 19, at 401.
21
See infra Table 1.
22
The Size of the World Wide Web (The Internet), WORLDWIDEWEBSIZE,
(Dec. 19, 2020),
https://web.archive.org/web/20151219004022/https://www.worldwidewebsi
ze.com/.
23
See infra Table 1.
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Year
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
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All
Notices
125,281
531,414
565,162
865,446
1,311,666

Google
Notices
120,043
527,329
556,317
845,587
1,247,523

All Complaints
213,961
2,388,048
21,991,936
29,127,087
34,286,247

Google
Complaints
212,394
2,375,073
21,939,895
29,105,686
34,238,388

All
Requests
3,802,418
57,201,313
226,160,982
317,133,198
565,247,833

[Vol. 37
Google
Requests
3,800,845
57,188,338
226,108,937
317,110,917
565,150,528

Table 1: Notices, Complaints and Takedown Requests between 2011 and
2015 as reported to the Lumen database (N2= 3,398,969)24

On the other hand, it can be argued that the scale of these
actions has achieved the objective of disabling access to infringing
resources. Google has reported that notwithstanding the huge increases
in notices and takedown requests received, takedown rates have been
consistently high—at 97.5% from 2011–2012,25 and above 98% in
2015.26 Similarly, Microsoft reports that for the second half of 2018,
the takedown rate for its Bing search engine is even higher, at
99.77%.27 Outside of the realm of search engines, social media
websites, like Twitter, also have consistently high takedown rates—at
61.8% in the second half of 2013 and at 74.0% in the second half of
2015.28 In fact, the passage of Article 17 of the Copyright Directive and
its takedown-and-stay-down mechanism are premised on the efficacy
of existing takedown notices—with the added obligation on service
providers to ensure that the materials disabled via the takedown notices

24

Results obtained by way of a MySQL COUNT of second dataset (see infra
text at note 54) of all notices, complaints and requests, and all notices,
complaints and requests where recipient name is Google Inc.
25
How
Google
Fights
Piracy,
GOOGLE,
14
(2013),
https://docs.google.com/file/d/0BwxyRPFduTN2dVFqYml5UENUeUE/edit
[hereinafter How Google Fights Piracy]; see also Fred von Lohmann,
Transparency for Copyright Removals in Search, GOOGLE (May 24, 2012),
http://googleblog.blogspot.ca/2012/05/transparency-for-copyright-removalsin.html#!/2012/05/transparency-for-copyright-removals-in.html.
26
How Google Fights Piracy, GOOGLE, 38 (July 13, 2016),
https://drive.google.com/file/d/0BwxyRPFduTN2TmpGajJ6TnRLaDA/view.
27
Content
Removal
Requests
Report,
MICROSOFT,
https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/corporate-responsibility/content-removalrequests-report.
28
DMCA Takedown Notices, TWITTER (Aug. 19, 2020),
https://transparency.twitter.com/en/reports/copyright-notices.html#2015-juldec.
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remain inaccessible.29 All these suggest that contrary to the attempts
made to reform the DMCA, the current takedown system of notices and
requests is accurate, reliable and clearly effective.
But is it? The study most quoted on takedown notices is the
2006 empirical study by Jennifer Urban and Laura Quilter.30 In
reviewing 876 notices submitted to the Chilling Effects project through
August 2005,31 the authors found that at least one-third (37%) of the
notices had substantive legal flaws relating to the underlying copyright
claims or had significant noncompliance with the DMCA formalities
for issuing takedown notices.32 In a subsequent expanded study
covering notices over a six-month period in 2013,33 Urban et al. found
that 4.2% of takedown requests were fundamentally flawed for
mismatches in copyrighted and infringing content, and 28% of
takedown requests were found to contain characteristics, such as
statutory non-compliance and fair use, that raise clear questions about

29

See Copyright Directive, supra note 2, Recital 66 para. 4 (recognizing this
as part of the “high industry standards of professional diligence” expected of
online service providers); see also Axel Voss, Europäisches Urheberrecht
(June 18, 2018),
https://web.archive.org/web/20180705234103/https://www.axel-vosseuropa.de/2018/06/18/stellungnahme-zur-reform-des-urheberrechts/
(contending, as rapporteur of the Copyright Directive, for the further
strengthening of the takedown mechanism by replacing it with a “takedownand-stay-down” mechanism by requiring online platforms to take more
responsibility on the basis that existing takedown and filtering mechanisms
have been working successfully on platforms such as YouTube). There is, of
course, the critical question of whether the stay-down mechanism is feasible,
which is separate from whether the takedown itself is accurate.
30
Jennifer M. Urban & Laura Quilter, Efficient Process or “Chilling Effects”?
Takedown Notices under Section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act,
22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 621 (2006) [hereinafter
Efficient Process].
31
Id. at 641.
32
Id. at 667. Google seems to agree with this figure. See Internet Service
Provider Copyright Code of Practice – TCF Consultation Draft, GOOGLE, 9
n.3 (Mar. 6, 2009),
https://web.archive.org/web/20160209121517/http://www.tcf.org.nz/content/
ebc0a1f5-6c04-48e5-9215-ef96d06898c0.cmr.
33
Jennifer M. Urban et al., Notice and Takedown in Everyday Practice, (UC
Berkeley
Pub.
Law
Research
Paper
No.
2755628),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2755628
[hereinafter
Notice and Takedown].
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their validity.34 And in a recent debate about SOPA and OPEN, a
service provider representative claimed, without citing further
evidence, that 5 to 10% of DMCA takedown notices are fraudulent.35
In the same vein, since Google began publishing daily postings
of its takedown details, there has been limited systematic scrutiny of
Google’s takedown notices processed by various academic and internet
observers.36 This has consistently generated anecdotal reports of
“abusive” notices37 and notices that (intentionally or unintentionally)
erroneously targeted legitimate content sites.38 There were also
34

Id. at 11–12.
Jon Brodkin, Fighting Internet Piracy: CES Takes on SOPA vs. OPEN
Debate, ARSTECHNICA (Jan. 10, 2012, 5:10 PM), http://arstechnica.com/techpolicy/2012/01/fighting-internet-piracy-ces-takes-on-sopa-vs-open-debate/.
36
See, e.g., Research, LUMEN, https://lumendatabase.org/pages/research (last
visited Feb. 2, 2021).
37
Abusive notices include those issued to seek the removal of unflattering
information publicly posted about companies and individuals. See, e.g.,
Unsafe Harbors: Abusive DMCA Subpoenas and Takedown Demands, THE
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION (Sept. 26, 2003), http://www.wipo.int
/export/sites/www/meetings/en/2005
/wipo_iis/presentations/pdf/wipo_iis_05_cdoctorow.pdf; Takedown Hall of
Shame, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, https://www.eff.org/
takedowns; Paul Alan Levy, A Bogus DMCA Takedown from Apple,
LAW
&
POLICY
BLOG
(Nov.
21,
2013),
CONSUMER
http://pubcit.typepad.com/clpblog/2013/11/a-bogus-dmca-takedown-fromapple.html; Ernesto Van der Sar, “Trolls” Try to Censor TorrentFreak’s
Copyright Trolls Coverage, TORRENTFREAK (Nov. 13, 2016),
https://torrentfreak.com/trolls-try-to-censor-torrentfreaks-copyright-trollscoverage-161113/.
38
See, e.g., Ernesto Van der Sar, Movie Studios Ask Google to Censor Their
Own Films, Facebook and Wikipedia, TORRENTFREAK (Dec. 3, 2012),
https://torrentfreak.com/movie-studios-ask-google-to-censor-their-ownfilms-facebook-and-wikipedia-121203/ (reporting that an anti-piracy
organization known as “Yes It Is – No Piracy!” ostensibly so/ught to takedown
legitimate copies of films on behalf of the movie studios on Verizon, Amazon,
iTunes and so on, and even remove film reviews published by The Guardian,
The Independent, The Mirror and the Daily Mail); Ernesto Van der Sar, HBO
Wants Google to Censor …. HBO.com, TORRENTFREAK (Feb. 3, 2013),
http://torrentfreak.com/hbo-wants-google-to-censor-hbo-com-130203/; Leigh
Beadon, You’re All the Weakest Link: Bad Law Permits Bad Takedowns,
Which Google Handles Badly, TECHDIRT (Apr. 22, 2013, 2:21 PM),
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130422/09303922801/youre-all-weakestlink-bad-law-permits-bad-takedowns-which-google-handles-badly.shtml;
35
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falsified notices39 that forced the reporters, who had allegedly served
such notices, to claim that their systems were compromised40 or were
sent by imposters.41 While errors are to be expected of a takedown
system that is largely automated and driven by computers,
occasionally,42 the errors may be one too many. In September 2013,
Microsoft terminated its partnership with leakID, a reporter, for

Andy Maxwell, Thanks for the Really Counter-Productive DMCA
Complaints, TORRENTFREAK (May 24, 2015), http://torrentfreak.com/thanksfor-the-really-counter-productive-dmca-complaints-150524/; Ernesto Van de
Sar, Premier League Asks Google to Take Down Facebook’s Homepage,
TORRENTFREAK (Apr. 29, 2017), https://torrentfreak.com/premier-leagueasks-google-to-take-down-facebooks-homepage-170429/; Ernesto Van der
Sar, Rightsholders Remove Google Results of Legal Search Engine
(Aug.
11,
2019),
‘JustWatch’,
TORRENTFREAK
https://torrentfreak.com/rightsholders-remove-google-results-of-legalsearch-engine-justwatch/; Andy Maxwell, DMCA Takedowns Try to Delist
Dozens of Adult Homepages from Google, TORRENTFREAK (June 8, 2019),
https://torrentfreak.com/dmca-takedowns-try-to-delist-dozens-of-adulthomepages-from-google-190608/.
39
See, e.g., Eric Limer, Prankster Uses Bogus DMCA Notices to Takedown
Bieber’s
YouTube
Channel
(Sept.
1,
2011,
4:40
PM),
https://www.themarysue.com/bogus-dmca-beiber-gaga/; Jon Brodkin, How a
Single DMCA Notice Took Down 1.45 Million Education Blogs, ARS
TECHNICA (Oct. 15, 2012, 3:00 PM), http://arstechnica.com/informationtechnology/2012/10/how-a-single-dmca-notice-took-down-1-45-millioneducation-blogs/; Ernesto Van der Sar, Microsoft DMCA Notice ‘Mistakenly’
Targets BBC, Techcrunch, Wikipedia and U.S. Govt, TORRENTFREAK (Oct. 7,
2012), http://torrentfreak.com/microsofts-bogus-dmca-notices-censor-bbccnn-wikipedia-spotify-and-more-121007/.
40
See, e.g., Andy Maxwell, Anti-Piracy Co. Blames Hack for Bogus DMCAs,
But They’re Just Sloppy, TORRENTFREAK, (Mar. 7, 2012),
http://torrentfreak.com/anti-piracy-co-blames-hack-for-bogus-dmcas-buttheyre-just-sloppy-120307/.
41
See, e.g., Ernesto Van der Sar, Scammers Hit Pirate Game Sites With
‘Irreversible’ Google Takedowns, TORRENTFREAK (Nov. 30, 2018),
https://torrentfreak.com/scammers-hit-pirate-game-sites-with-irreversiblegoogle-takedowns-181130/; Ernesto Van der Sar, ‘Netflix’ Flags Netflix.com
As a Pirate Site, Or Does It? TORRENTFREAK (June 2, 2019),
https://torrentfreak.com/netflix-flags-netflix-com-as-a-pirate-site-or-does-it190602/; Ernesto Van der Sar, Fake MPAA Asks Google to Remove Thousands
of URLs, Including MPAA.org, TORRENTFREAK (July 14, 2019),
https://torrentfreak.com/fake-mpaa-asks-google-to-remove-thousands-ofurls-including-mpaa-org-190714/.
42
See, e.g., Disney Enterprises, Inc. v. Hotfile Corp., No. 11-20427-CIV, 2013
WL 6336286 at *15 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 20, 2013).
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sending out inaccurate notices, including notices that targeted
Microsoft's Wikipedia entry and even Microsoft’s own website for
piracy.43 That is not to say that leakID (and Microsoft) were not
previously warned. Although their identities were not publicly
disclosed, it is believed44 that leakID was one of two reporters who had
been ejected by Google a year earlier from its Trusted Copyright
Removal Program for Web Search (TCRP) for repeatedly sending
inaccurate notices.45 Should Microsoft have taken heed from leakID's
eviction from the TCRP? Or should leakID itself have cleaned up its
act after its loss of TCRP status?
So, what is the true state of the quality of takedown notices
today? Do the reporting mechanisms of owners and reporters identify
infringing materials and activities accurately? Surely that is a
prerequisite to a takedown regime and is critical to the success of a
takedown-and-stay-down regime.46 In fact, if the quality of takedown
notices is poor, the stay-down regime will reinforce the concerns of
pundits that it will operate as a censorship system that will stymie the
freedom of expression and information.47 Thus, it is crucial to identify
the types of errors made by owners and reporters when issuing and
processing takedown notices and the rates of these errors. The
explosion of takedown notices is because of the use of sophisticated

43

Ernesto Van der Sar, Microsoft Ditches Anti-Piracy Partner After
Embarrassing DMCA Takedowns, TORRENTFREAK (Sept. 27, 2013),
http://torrentfreak.com/microsoft-ditches-anti-piracy-partner-afterembarrassing-dmca-takedowns-130927/.
44
This is from a close examination of the contents of LeakID’s issued
takedown notices as stored in the Chilling Effects Lumen database. The
indicative date of termination of LeakID’s partnership is Aug. 23, 2012. Cf.,
for instances, the following notices, Software DMCA (Copyright) Complaint
to Google, LUMEN (Aug. 22, 2012),
https://www.lumendatabase.org/notices/1221009, with DMCA (Copyright)
Complaint to Google, LUMEN (Aug. 23, 2012),
https://www.lumendatabase.org/notices/1228118.
45
How Google Fights Piracy, supra note 25, at 17.
46
See S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 46 (1998); H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 55
(1998) (referring to the need for the adequate identification information to
"reasonably sufficient to permit the service provider to identify and locate the
allegedly infringing material").
47
See, e.g., Daniel Nazer, Copyright, The First Wave of Internet Censorship,
FRONTIER
FOUNDATION
(Jan.
18,
2018),
ELECTRONIC
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/01/copyright-first-wave-internetcensorship.
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tools and automated means that use digital fingerprinting, hash values
and keyword or metadata searches to identify unlicensed content that
is being disseminated—the so-called “robo-takedowns.”48 Can we trust
these mechanisms that operate with little or no human intervention?49
This paper examines these questions in four parts. Part I
explains the methodology used for extracting the notices addressed to
Google for this case study. Part II analyzes the notices for their
compliance with DMCA formalities (“formal errors”). Part III analyzes
the notices for errors that go to the substance of the claims embedded
in notices (“substantive errors”). And Part IV concludes with some
proposals for legal reform to address the formal and substantive errors
studied in this paper.
I.

STUDY METHODOLOGY
A. The Datasets

The methodology used in this paper builds on the study
methodology used in an earlier paper,50 which accessed the Chilling
Effects repository for takedown notices.51 The first dataset was built by
collating individual takedown notices submitted to the Chilling Effects
repository. For this dataset, a cut-off date of December 31, 2012 was
used. After parsing the notices, and filtering only for notices submitted
to Google, this yielded slightly more than half-a-million (N1=501,286)
fully parsed notices submitted to Google, comprising 56,991,045
takedown requests.52
After the Chilling Effects repository was superseded by the
Lumen repository,53 the second dataset was built by collating
individual takedown notices submitted by all participating online

48

Zoe Carpou, Robots, Pirates, and the Rise of the Automated Takedown
Regime: Using the DMCA to Right Piracy and Protect End-Users, 39 COLUM.
J. L. & ARTS 551 (2016).
49
Brief of Amicus Curiae Electronic Frontier Foundation in Support of
Hotfile’s Opposition to Summary Judgment on its Counterclaim at 19, Disney
Enterprises, Inc. v. Hotfile Corp., No. 11-20427-CIV, 2013 WL 6336286
(S.D. Fla. Sept. 20, 2013).
50
Seng, supra note 19, at 378–83.
51
The repository is of takedown notices between 2009 and 2012, referred to
in this paper as the first dataset.
52
Seng, supra note 19, at 383.
53
About Us, LUMEN, https://lumendatabase.org/pages/about (last visited Feb.
2, 2021) [hereinafter Lumen – About Us].
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service providers,54 including Google, Twitter55 and Microsoft,56 to the
Lumen repository.57 The second dataset used cut-off dates of between
January 1, 2011 and December 31, 2015. Like the first dataset, a
census58 of all copyright-related DMCA notices submitted to Google
was conducted.59 This yielded more than three million (N2=3,398,969)
notices (including 3,296,799 notices submitted to Google), comprising
88.0 million takedown complaints and 1.17 billion takedown
requests.60 The second dataset is primarily used to analyze the notices,
complaints and requests for formal and substantive errors.

54

LUMEN, https://lumendatabase.org/.
Lumen – About Us, supra note 53 (listing, among others, Google Inc. and
Twitter, Inc. as contributors to the Lumen repository).
56
See, e.g., Search, LUMEN,
https://lumendatabase.org/notices/search?utf8=%E2%9C%93&recipient_na
me=Bing&sort_by= (showing, since Feb. 3, 2020, 30,225 results of notices
submitted to Microsoft Bing) (last visited Feb. 3, 2021).
57
LUMEN, https://lumendatabase.org/.
58
Conducting a census will also enable a longitudinal analysis to be made of
various issues investigated.
59
These would be those tagged using the Lumen meta data as relating to
“dmca” disputes.
60
More exactly, 88,007,279 takedown complaints and 1,169,545,744 requests
were detected in the second dataset. Results obtained by way of a MySQL
COUNT of second dataset of all notices, complaints and requests.
55
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Notice
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Average
Requests/
Notice

SD
Requests/
Notice

Max
Requests/
Notice

All Notices (N 2=3,299,265)
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015

1.71
4.49
38.91
33.66
26.14

8.36
32.97
138.85
126.05
103.55

997
1,943
1,998
2,000
1,513

30.35
107.64
400.17
366.44
430.94

152.27
665.48
1,411.95
1,442.74
1,628.81

9,967
25,050
23,147
23,426
21,687

Google notices only (N=3,296,799)
2011
1.77
8.51
2012
4.50
33.09
2013
39.44
139.88
2014
34.42
127.42
2015
27.45
106.01

997
1,943
1,998
2,000
1,513

31.66
108.45
406.44
375.02
453.02

155.42
667.99
1,422.25
1,458.48
1,667.17

9,967
25,050
23,147
23,426
21,687

90
40
108
20
1

0.31
3.29
5.96
1.12
1.52

2.85
6.38
8.79
4.86
6.42

90
40
108
271
362

Non-Google notices only
2011
0.31
2012
3.29
2013
5.96
2014
1.08
2015
0.75

2.85
6.38
8.79
3.63
0.44

Table 2: Average, Standard Deviation and Maximum Number of Complaints
and Requests per Notice between 2011 and 2015, for All Notices, Google
Notices and Non-Google Notices (N2=3,299,265)61

While the first and second datasets overlap for the years 2011
and 2012, the second dataset shows a significant change in the way
takedown requests are reported to online service providers. To begin,
unlike the notices reviewed in the 2006 study,62 there has been a
significant increase in the use of complaints as “sub-notices” within
each notice since 2011.63 Averaging 1.71 complaints per notice in
2011, this figure rose to 4.49 complaints per notice in 2012 and by
2015, it had reached 26.14 complaints per notice.64 The number of

61

Results obtained by using MySQL to conduct on the second dataset a SUM
of COUNT of complaints and requests for each notice for each year and
conducting basic analysis to compute the average, standard deviation and
maximum statistics.
62
See Urban & Quilter, supra note 30, at 658–63. The description of notices
in Efficient Process implies that most of the notices then (pre-2006) examined
contained a takedown request for either a single work or a closely-related set
of works such as a portfolio; this is empirically observed to no longer hold
true with the present dataset.
63
See supra Table 2.
64
See supra Table 2.
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takedown requests per notice has also risen from an average of 30.35
requests per notice in 2011 to 430.94 requests per notice in 2015.65
The rise in the use of complaints within notices and the
increase in takedown requests per notice appear to be prompted in no
small part by Google’s introduction of the TCRP program sometime in
March 2011, which permitted TCRP members to make bulk
submissions of takedown notices and requests directly to Google.66 The
ratio of complaints to notices increased even further with the lifting of
the cap on takedown requests by Google in April 2013.67 This had the
effect of dramatically increasing the maximum number of requests per
notice. For instance, while the maximum number of requests in a notice
was 9,967 in 2011, since 2012, the number has not fallen below
20,000.68 As the table above shows,69 all these records of complaints
and requests per notice are set only by Google notices: non-Google
notices have witnessed much smaller averages and maximum
complaints and requests per notice, often smaller by several orders of
magnitude than Google notices.
The ability to pack so many requests into a single takedown
notice has both encouraged and in turn facilitated the use by reporters
of automated tools to detect infringing resources and submit large
numbers of these takedown requests in an automated manner to online
service providers for quick action.70 The voluminous quantities of
takedown requests coupled with the speed of takedowns has therefore
increased the urgency of independently validating the veracity of these
takedown notices, complaints and requests.

65

While the average number of complaints and requests per notice appear
reasonable, the standard deviations are high, suggesting a large amount of
variance in the number of complaints and requests per notice over the whole
dataset. An examination of the distribution reveals that a small number of
reporters are responsible for sending a disproportionate majority of notices
containing large numbers of complaints of requests, but there are many oneoff or infrequent reporters who send small notices dealing with isolated
instances of infringement. See Seng, supra note 19, at 397.
66
Seng, supra note 19, at 414–16.
67
Id.
68
See supra Table 2.
69
See supra Table 2.
70
See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Giganews, Inc., No. 11-CV-07098-AB (SHx), 2015
WL 1746406, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2015).
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B. Limitations of the Dataset
The limitations of the first dataset were explored in an earlier
paper.71 In particular, because this study focuses exclusively on
Google’s takedown notices, the observations made here may not relate
easily to other online service providers. Also, both datasets do not
include takedown notices received by Google as part of its YouTube
Content ID system.72
An earlier iteration of this paper made exclusive use of the first
dataset, which was derived from Lumen’s predecessor, Chilling
Effects.73 When it was sought to repeat the same analysis using the
second dataset, which was derived from Lumen, it was discovered that
there are differences in how Lumen and Chilling Effects record and
present takedown notices. As a result, certain analyses possible on the
Chilling Effects dataset are not possible on the Lumen dataset. For
instance, while Chilling Effects recorded data related to statutory
formalities, such as DMCA attestations as separate fields, Lumen does
not. These differences will be pointed out as and when they occur in a
form germane to the results.
In addition, in the process of analyzing these notices, data
formatting inconsistencies and truncation of the contents of a small
number of Google notices (fewer than a thousand) in the first dataset
were detected.74 To the extent that the DMCA attestations were
appended to the end of notices, the corruption could explain the many
instances of attestation errors.75 However, to the extent that the notices
are missing the requisite attestations, this paper reports them as they
are.
Finally, notwithstanding the efforts of the Chilling Effects and
Lumen repositories to redact the names and identities of individual
71

Seng, supra note 19, at 383–88.
The Content ID system works because participating content providers have
submitted eighty million digital fingerprints of their audio and video works to
YouTube, which are matched against every uploaded video. See Mission
Report: Towards More Effectiveness of Copyright Law on Online Content
Sharing Platforms: Overview of Content Recognition Tools and Possible
Ways Forward, FRENCH MINISTRY OF CULTURE 16 (Jan. 29, 2020),
https://www.culture.gouv.fr/content/download/265045/file/Mission%20Repo
rt%20Content%20Recognition%20Tools%20ENG%20V.pdf?inLanguage=fr
e-FR.
73
See Lumen – About Us, supra note 53.
74
Seng, supra note 19, at 388.
75
See infra note 114 and accompanying text.
72

136

SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J.

[Vol. 37

parties from the takedown notices,76 the parsers developed for this
study managed to extract from notices some individual names and
identities that were not redacted.77 Reference will be made to some of
these individual names in this paper to illustrate the points about
mistakes in notices, but in this paper, these individuals' names have
been scrambled to preserve their identities and protect their privacy.
II.

COMPLIANCE WITH DMCA FORMALITIES
A. The Two Classes of Notice Formalities under Section
512(c)(3)(A)

Section 512 provides that an online service provider shall be
exempted from monetary relief if, among others, it responds
expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, allegedly infringing
material or activity,78 upon an “effective notification” of claimed
infringement.79 To be an effective notification, it must be “a [single]80
written communication”81 provided to the “designated agent”82 of a
service provider that includes “substantially” the following six
formalities:
(i)

(ii)

76

a physical or electronic signature of a person
authorized to act on behalf of the owner of an
exclusive right that is allegedly infringed (“notice
signature”);83
the identification of the copyrighted work claimed
to have been infringed, or a representative list of
such works, if multiple copyrighted works at a
single site are targeted in the notice (“description
of the copyrighted work”);84

See
Lumen
Tools
for
Researchers,
LUMEN
(2017),
https://www.lumendatabase.org/pages/researchers#database.
77
See infra note 217 and accompanying text.
78
17 U.S.C. §§ 512(b)(2)(E), (c)(1)(C), (d)(3).
79
See S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 45–46 (1998).
80
Perfect 10, Inc. v. Google, Inc., No. CV 04-9484 AHM (SHx)SHX, 2010
WL 9479059, at *11 (C.D. Cal. July 26, 2010).
81
Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1113 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting
that the notice has to be in the form of a single and not separate pieces of
written communication).
82
17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(2).
83
17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(i).
84
17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(ii).
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the identification of the material claimed to be
infringing or to be the subject of infringing activity
and that is to be removed or access to which is to
be disabled, and information reasonably sufficient
to permit the service provider to locate the
material (“takedown request”85);86
information reasonably sufficient to permit the
service provider to contact the complaining party,
such as an address, telephone number, and if
available, the complaining party's electronic mail
address (“reporter’s contact information”);87
a statement that the complainant “has a good faith
belief that use of the material in the manner
complained of is not authorized by the copyright
owner, its agent, or the law” (“statement of good
faith belief”);88 and
a statement that “the information in the
notification is accurate, and under penalty of
perjury, that the complaining party is authorized to
act on behalf of the owner of an exclusive right
that is allegedly infringed” (“statement of
accuracy and authorization”).89

Exact compliance with the formal requirements is not required: the test
is one of substantial compliance.90 A notice that fails to comply
substantially with the formalities need not be acted on by the recipient
service provider as it is not “effective.”91 And an ineffective notice
cannot be considered to form the corpus of the service provider's actual
knowledge or “red flag knowledge” of infringing activity.92 It will also
not trigger the service provider's obligations with respect to its “repeat

85

See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(iii).
87
17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(iv).
88
17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(v).
89
17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(vi).
90
17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A).
91
Id.
92
17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(B)(i); see S. REP. NO. 105-190 at 45 (1998)
(explaining that neither actual knowledge nor awareness of a red flag may be
imputed to a service provider based on information from a copyright owner,
or its agents, that does not comply with the notification provisions set out in §
512(c)(3). In such a circumstance, the service provider's indemnity from fiscal
damages is intact.); see also S. REP. NO. 105-190 at 46–47 (1998).
86
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infringer policy.”93 However a savings clause in the DMCA provides
that an “ineffective” notice that otherwise substantially complies with
(ii), (iii) and (iv) may be considered in evaluating a service provider’s
knowledge of infringing activity unless it “promptly attempts to contact
[the complainant] or takes other reasonable steps to assist in the receipt
of notification that substantially complies” with all the aforesaid formal
requirements.94 Presumably, the service provider need not act on such
an “ineffective” notice after it has contacted the complainant unless the
complainant subsequently rectifies it.95
This means that while every notice has to “substantially” meet
all six formalities,96 in terms of the consequences of non-compliance,
the formalities may be divided into two broad classes: the
“functional”97 or “one-shot only” formalities—description of the
copyrighted work, the takedown request and the reporter’s contact
information (items (ii), (iii) and (iv))—and the “non-functional” or
“second-shot possible” formalities—the notice signature, the statement
of good faith belief, and the statement of accuracy and authorization
(items (i), (v) and (vi)).98 (The two statements are also referred to in
this paper as “the attestations.”). Rewording the explanation above, the
difference between the two classes of formalities is that if there is no
substantial compliance with the functional formalities, the notice fails
in limine, but where a notice fails to substantially comply with the nonfunctional formalities, the service provider is obliged to contact the
complainant and give her a second chance to remedy these defects.99

93

Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1111 (9th Cir. 2007).
17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(B)(ii); see S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 46–47 (1998).
95
See S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 47 (1998) (explaining that if the service provider
subsequently receives a substantially complainant notice, it would be required
to act expeditiously on it); cf. Urban & Quilter, supra note 3033, at 674
(suggesting that an online service provider is not exempt from responding to
a notice with errors in the non-functional formalities).
96
See Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1112 (9th Cir. 2007)
(“substantial compliance means substantial compliance with all of §
512(c)(3)'s clauses, not just some of them.”).
97
See S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 47 (1998); see also H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt.
2, at 56 (1998) (using the term “functional requirements” to describe those
formalities where sufficient information must be supplied to ensure that the
notification and take down procedures may operate).
98
See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(B)(ii).
99
Id.
94
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B. “Substantial Compliance” and “Technical Errors”
In Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, the court held that a notice
that is completely missing one or more of the required elements cannot
be said to substantially comply with the requirements of section
512(c)(3).100 The court considered this to be beyond a “technical
error.”101 So what is the standard of “substantial compliance” which
notices have to meet with respect to each of the formalities, assuming
that it is not missing any of these formalities? The DMCA does not
elucidate.102
The Senate and House Reports note that “substantial
compliance” includes compliance in which “technical errors” such as
misspelling a name, supplying outdated area codes for phone numbers
if the numbers are accompanied by accurate addresses, or supplying
outdated names (of the prior designated agent) if accompanied by valid
e-mail addresses for the successor agent are disregarded.103 Aside from
these examples, which relate only to the reporter’s contact information
(item (iv)), the Reports offer no further guidance. But the DMCA
caselaw offers additional insights.
In Rosen v. Hosting Services Inc., the court rejected notices
that erroneously identified the copyrighted work claimed to have been
infringed (item (ii)).104 In Perfect 10, Inc. v. Google, Inc., the court
likewise rejected notices that broadly referred to more than 15,000
images appearing on the plaintiff’s website as lacking the identification
of the copyrighted work claimed to have been infringed.105
The court also rejected notices with requests that specify toplevel URLs and truncated URLs (item (iii)).106 The court opined that an
100

Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1112 (9th Cir. 2007) (“The
statute thus signals that substantial compliance means substantial compliance
with all of § 512(c)(3)’s clauses, not just some of them.”).
101
Id.
102
Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 351
F.3d 1229, 1236 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
103
S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 47 (1998); H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 56
(1998).
104
Rosen v. Hosting Servs., Inc., 771 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1222 (C.D. Cal.
2010).
105
Perfect 10, Inc. v. Google, Inc., No. CV 04-9484 AHM (SHx), 2010 WL
9479059, at *10–12 (C.D. Cal. July 26, 2010).
106
Id. at 10, 12, 14 (rejecting the Group C notices issued against Google’s
Search and Blogger services, because the URLs were incomplete and were
instead truncated by ellipses).
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incomplete URL is not a specific link that affords identification of the
infringing material.107 Likewise, in Perfect 10, Inc. v. Giganews, Inc.,
the court rejected notices that direct the recipient service provider to
conduct a particular search for the allegedly infringing Usenet
message. It held that search results rather than URIs (which encompass
URLs and Usenet message identifiers)108 would not enable the service
provider to unambiguously identify and locate the Usenet message in
question.109
From the aforesaid DMCA cases, it is possible to construe a
more general rule for determining when an incomplete (as opposed to
a missing) formality will cease to be substantial compliance. Case law
has generally interpreted “substantial” compliance with reference to
“something less than a strict and literal compliance.”110 MerriamWebster's Collegiate Dictionary defines “substantial” as “being largely
but not wholly that which is specified.”111 But while some deviation is
permitted, the requisite level of “compliance” is one that has to meet

107

Id. at 13, 12 n.9.
A URI is an Internet address, and as an engineering unit, it unambiguously
resolves to a specific location where online resources can be found. The
Uniform Resource Indicator (URI) is a string of characters used to identify a
name or an Internet resource. A URI can be a Uniform Resource Locator (URL
or web address) or a Uniform Resource Name (URN), such as a Usernet
message-ID. A URI therefore includes a URL. For an explanation of the
difference between a URI and a URL, see MICHAEL MEALLING & RAY
DENENBERG, REPORT FROM THE JOINT W3C/IETF URI PLANNING INTEREST
GROUP: UNIFORM RESOURCE IDENTIFIERS (URIS), URLS, AND UNIFORM
RESOURCE NAMES (URNS): CLARIFICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, (The
Internet Society 3 (2002), available at http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3305. In
this study, for the most part, the two terms can be used interchangeably, since
the resources referred to here are primarily web pages and resources. For a
longer discussion, see Seng, supra note 19, at 401–02.
109
Perfect 10, Inc. v. Giganews, Inc., 993 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1200-1201
(C.D.Cal. 2014) (drawing the analogy between a Message-ID which is the
only unique identifier to locate Usenet messages and the URL).
110
Wells Benz, Inc. v. United States, 333 F.2d 89, 92 (9th Cir.1964)
(explaining that substantial compliance “does imply something less than a
strict and literal compliance with the contract provisions but fundamentally it
means that the deviation is unintentional and so minor or trivial as not
‘substantially to defeat the object which the parties intend to accomplish.’”).
111
Definition
of
Substantial,
MERRIAM
WEBSTER
(2020),
https://www.merriam-webster.com/thesaurus/substantial.
108
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the “essential statutory purpose”112 of the formalities or procedural
provisions. The following quotation is often cited to explain the
requirement of “substantial compliance”:
“Substantial compliance” with a statute means actual
compliance in respect to the substance essential to
every reasonable objective of the statute. It means that
a court should determine whether the statute has been
followed sufficiently so as to carry out the intent for
which it was adopted. Substantial compliance with a
statute is not shown unless it is made to appear that the
purpose of the statute is shown to have been served.
What constitutes substantial compliance with a statute
is a matter depending on the facts of each particular
case. (emphasis added).113
What is “substantial compliance” with the formalities, therefore, is a
question of identifying the extent of deviation from “strict and literal
compliance” and the statutory purpose behind each formality deviated
from. Here, it is vital to understand the context in which takedown
notices operate today. As the first paper demonstrated,114 gone are the
days where copyright owners and reporters submit a few notices each
day, which are then reviewed manually for errors by service providers.
With higher volumes of takedown requests from “robo-requests” and
faster turnarounds expected of many service providers, it is submitted
that the types of errors tolerated will become smaller. This will explain
why the Senate Report uses the term “technical” error to describe those
errors which are accepted as being in “substantial compliance”—
misspelled names, outdated area codes for phone numbers
accompanied by accurate addresses, or outdated names accompanied
by valid e-mail addresses.115 These are errors which service providers
can afford the indulgence of oversight because at the time the U.S.
Congress enacted the DMCA, “less than 5% of the world’s population

112

American Air Filter Co, v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 81 T.C. 709,
719 (1983) (“substantial compliance with regulatory requirements may suffice
when such requirements are procedural and when the essential statutory
purposes have been fulfilled.”).
113
Wagner v. Truesdell, 574 N.W.2d 627, 629 (S.D. 1998).
114
Seng, supra note 19, at 389 (noting that Google received less than 1,000
takedown notices in 2009, which was more than 10 years after its
incorporation).
115
See S. REP. No. 105-190, at 47 (1998).
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used the internet,”116 and it did not “anticipate the online world as we
now know it—where, each day, users post hundreds of millions of
photos, videos and other items, and service providers receive over a
million notices of alleged infringement.”117
If so, in the context of today’s world of automated takedown
notices, the term “technical errors” has to receive a narrower definition.
It is submitted that “technical errors” have to be errors that are
“endogenously detectable” and “endogenously remediable.” An error
is “detectable” if the existence of the error can be detected. It is
“endogenously detectable” if it is erroneous or ambiguous on its face;
unlike an error which is “exogenously detectable” if reference is made
to external resources to ascertain that the information is in error. An
error must be first “detectable” before it can be “remedied,” though
detecting it is no assurance that it can. It is “endogenously remediable”
if it can be corrected based on the existing information provided on the
notice, and it is “exogenously remediable” if it can only be corrected
with reference to external resources.
A close examination will show that the “technical error”
examples provided in the Senate Report118 are instances of errors
relating to the reporter’s contact information that are, using the terms
defined above, “endogenously detectable” and “endogenously
remediable.” For instance, where the correct telephone area code can
be inferred from an accurate address that is supplied, or where the name
of the prior reporting agent can be disregarded because the new
reporter's e-mail address is supplied,119 these will count as “technical
errors.”
But the varying instances of “technical compliance” must
always take into account the statutory object of each of the formalities.
This is so particularly as regards the takedown request for
“identification of the material claimed to be infringing.”120 As noted
above, supplying the abbreviated, truncated, or misspelled URI is
invariably going to lead to a non-compliant notice121 because of the
critical need to be accurate, precise, and unambiguous with the

116

Section 512 Study, supra note 17, at 81862.
Id.
118
See S. REP. No. 105-190, at 47 (1998).
119
Id.
120
17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(iii).
121
Perfect 10, Inc. v. Google, Inc., No. CV 04-9484 AHM (SHx), 2010 WL
9479059 at *10, *12, *14 (C.D. Cal. July 26, 2010).
117
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takedown request.122 There is no way to unambiguously “guess” the
correct URI from a misspelt or erroneous URI. To have it otherwise
could lead to the removal of non-infringing material belonging to an
innocent user, and the termination of speech protected under the First
Amendment.123
In relation to this requirement, the U.S. Copyright Office in its
Section 512 Study in 2015 made the following observation:
Since the passage of the DMCA, courts have been
called upon to address the elements required for an
“effective”—i.e., valid—take down notice. Looking to
section 512's requirement to provide “information
reasonably sufficient to permit the service provider to
locate the material,” courts have generally required a
high degree of specificity, such as the particular link,
or uniform resource locator (“URL”), where the
infringing material is found. Likewise, service
providers often request that the specific URL for each
allegedly infringing use be included in a notice. Such
a requirement can be burdensome in the case of a
notice that references a large number of infringements
at multiple locations throughout the same site.
Additionally, copyright owners question whether this
level of specificity is in conflict with the statute's
express language allowing complaining parties to
submit a “representative list” of works alleged to be
infringed “at a single online site.”124
This observation surely cannot be correct. Firstly, the Copyright Office
erroneously cites as support for this observation, 17 U.S.C. §
512(c)(3)(A)(ii), which relates to describing the copyrighted work,

122

It is for this reason that the lower court in Viacom Intern. Inc. v. YouTube,
Inc. noted that “a copy or description of the allegedly infringing material and
the URL address of the web page location which is alleged to contain the
infringing material” is an example of sufficient information. See Viacom
Intern. Inc. v. Youtube, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 2d 110, 115 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
123
Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1112 (9th Cir. 2007)
(“Accusations of alleged infringement have drastic consequences: A user
could have content removed or may have his access terminated entirely. If the
content infringes, justice has been done. But if it does not, speech protected
under the First Amendment could be removed.”).
124
Section 512 Study, supra note 17, at 81865.
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rather than the infringing work.125 The Copyright Office seems to have
obscured the distinction between infringed works (i.e., copyrighted
works) with infringing works, contrary to the distinction maintained in
17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(ii) ("copyrighted work claimed to have been
infringed") and § 512(c)(3)(A)(iii) ("material . . . claimed to be
infringing"). Secondly, if multiple locations of a site harbor allegedly
infringing resources, the onus should remain on the copyright owners
to identify these locations and thus these resources. The DMCA is clear
in that it does not require the service provider to conduct affirmative
monitoring.126 The specificity of the URI operates as notification by the
copyright owner to the online service provider by imputing to the
service provider actual knowledge of specific and identifiable
infringement, which in turn triggers the service provider’s obligation
to effect an expeditious removal or disablement of access to that
resource.127 The requirement to provide a URI is thus consistent with
the entire takedown mechanism in the DMCA.
Turning to the item (ii) or “description of the copyrighted
work” claimed to have been infringed, as noted above, the DMCA
allows a representative list of copyrighted works to be submitted “if
multiple copyrighted works at a single online site are covered by a
single notification.”128 Presumably, there will be “substantial
compliance” if this list omits some copyrighted works that are claimed
to have been infringed by the single online site targeted by the
takedown request. However, this exception has been narrowly
construed to foreclose on a complaining party making a broad and
indiscriminating reference to all its copyrighted works as failing to
provide the requisite identification of the copyrighted work claimed to
have been infringed.129 The rationale for this must be that the concept
of a representative list is only tenable when the Internet, as conceived
when the DMCA was enacted in 1998, was small and the number of
125

Id. at 81865 n.41.
17 U.S.C. § 512(m); see S. REP. No. 105-190, at 48–49 (1998); H.R. REP.
No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 57–58 (1998).
127
Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 30 (2d Cir. 2012) (“Thus,
the nature of the removal obligation itself contemplates knowledge or
awareness of specific infringing material, because expeditious removal is
possible only if the service provider knows with particularity which items to
remove.”).
128
17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(ii).
129
Perfect 10, Inc. v. Google, Inc., No. CV -04-984 AHM (SHx), 2010 WL
9479059, at *10–12 (C.D. Cal. July 26, 2010).
126
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instances of copyright infringement were manageable manually.130
This is no longer the case, as can be seen by the numbers of takedown
notices sent by complaining parties using automated processes131 and
processed by online service providers through the use of scalable
systems to address the large volumes of notices.132 If the object behind
the “description of the copyrighted work” formality is to impute to the
online service provider the requisite knowledge of the specific instance
of infringement, there must also be the requisite specificity in
identifying the work being infringed.133
It is also well known that some infringing works are
deliberately misspelt to avoid or minimize detection by copyright
owners and their agents.134 Prominent examples include “Micro$oft”
and “Windoze” as intentional misspellings of Microsoft and
Windows.135 Perhaps some misspellings may be tolerated to some
degree, if any ambiguities can be endogenously resolved (e.g., there is
no doubt that “Micro$oft Windoze” refers to the Windows operating
system from Microsoft Corporation, particularly where Microsoft is
noted as the copyright owner in the notice). But to relax the
requirements of substantial compliance any further may be to require
the service provider to play mind reading games to figure out what the

130

Section 512 Study, supra note 17, at 81862 (“At that time, less than 5% of
the world’s population used the internet . . .”).
131
Id. at 81864.
132
Id. at 81865.
133
See Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 30 (2nd Cir. 2012);
see also Rosen v. Hosting Servs., Inc., 771 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1222 (2010).
134
See, e.g., Napster Faced with Big List, Trick Names, ABC NEWS (Jan. 6,
2006), https://abcnews.go.com/Entertainment/story?id=108389&page=1; see
also A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 2001 WL 227083, at *1 (N.D. Cal.
Mar. 5, 2001), aff'd, 284 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2002) ("All parties shall use
reasonable measures in identifying variations of the filename(s), or of the
spelling of the titles or artists' names, of the works identified by plaintiffs. If
it is reasonable to believe that a file available on the Napster system is a
variation of a particular work or file identified by plaintiffs, all parties have an
obligation to ascertain the actual identity (title and artist name) of the work
and to take appropriate action within the context of this Order.").
135
THE NEW HACKER’S DICTIONARY, VERSION 4.3.3 (2002),
https://www.landley.net/history/mirror/jargon.html#The%20Jargon%20Lexi
con.
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copyright owner or reporter intended to take down.136 Consequently,
this will encroach on the sacrosanct principle that a service provider is
under no obligation to monitor “its service or affirmatively seek[] facts
indicating infringing activity.”137 “The DMCA notification procedures
place the burden of policing copyright infringement—identifying the
potentially infringing material and adequately documenting
infringement—squarely on the owners of the copyright.”138 Given that
information identifying the infringed material may form the basis for
imputing actual or constructive knowledge of infringing activity upon
the service provider, it is submitted that compliance with this formality
has to be strict, and “substantial compliance” has to be narrow. Support
for this strict interpretation of the formality for description of the
copyrighted work can be found in the case of Rosen v. Hosting
Services, Inc., where the court held that a takedown notice which
misidentifies the allegedly infringed material is defective and as a
matter of law, the recipient service provider could not “be charged with
having the requisite knowledge to be contributorily liable.”139
C. Errors in Non-functional Formalities
So, what is the state of non-functional formalities compliance
of takedown notices based on the test of substantial compliance? Prior
to the use of automated systems leading to the present explosion in
takedown notices and web forms, the 2006 Urban and Quilter study140
found such “statutory flaws” in “one out of every eleven notices,” but
limited its analysis to the functional formalities, and did not include an
analysis of the non-functional formalities.141 However, a notice can
now comprise thousands of complaints, and each complaint can
comprise tens of thousands of takedown requests.142 Similarly, the use
of web forms has prevailed over all other forms of takedown notices.143
136

A mismatch between the name of the allegedly infringing work and the
copyright work would prima facie not appear to be an infringement from the
name alone; a hypothetical reporter might have to provide both the correct
name of the work, its misspelled (or even disguised) name, alongside further
substantiation as to why the allegedly infringing work is infringing.
137
17 U.S.C. § 512(m)(1).
138
Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1113 (2007).
139
Rosen v. Hosting Servs., Inc., 771 F. Supp. 2d at 1222.
140
See Urban & Quilter, supra note 30, at 621.
141
Id. at 674.
142
See Seng, supra note 19, at 434.
143
Id. at 398–400.
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Have these changes affected the rate of compliance with the DMCA
formalities rules?
This study starts first with the “non-functional” or “secondshot possible” formalities: the notice signature, the statement of good
faith belief and the statement of accuracy and authorization. That these
are “non-functional” formalities does not make them any less
important. As the court in CCBill explained:
The DMCA requires a complainant to declare, under
penalty of perjury, that he is authorized to represent
the copyright holder, and that he has a good-faith
belief that the use is infringing. This requirement is not
superfluous. Accusations of alleged infringement have
drastic consequences: A user could have content
removed or may have his access terminated entirely. If
the content infringes, justice has been done. But if it
does not, speech protected under the First Amendment
could be removed. We therefore do not require a
service provider to start potentially invasive
proceedings if the complainant is unwilling to state
under penalty of perjury that he is an authorized
representative of the copyright owner, and that he has
a good-faith belief that the material is unlicensed.144
Because “substantial compliance” of these non-functional formalities
may take a myriad of forms, for the purpose of this empirical study, to
avoid interpretational issues as to what constitutes “substantial
compliance,” especially disputes as to whether there is “substantial
compliance” in the particular context of the contents of a notice and for
that formality in issue, an “error” with a formality is narrowly defined
as one where the formality examined is completely missing from the
notice. So defined, a missing formality cannot be in compliance, let
alone be in substantial compliance. Likewise, a notice with a missing
formality cannot be said to be in compliance with the DMCA.145
The analysis below deals with data from the first dataset, since
it was discovered that only the Chilling Effects database retains
information on the non-functional formalities as earlier explained.146

144

Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1112 (9th Cir. 2007).
17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A).
146
See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
145
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Using the broad definition of an “electronic signature,”147
where a notice does not have an electronic symbol (“signed,”
“signature” or its variants) or a process (such as an appended signature
date, or appended name of the copyright owner or reporter) associated
with it, it will be flagged as in error for missing an electronic signature
(“Missing Notice Signature”).
For the attestations, as is the case in CCBill, where the notice
does not contain a statement that the complainant “has a good faith
belief that use of the material in the manner complained of is not
authorized by the copyright owner, its agent, or the law” (“Missing
Statement of Good Faith Belief”), or a statement that “the information
in the notification is accurate” (“Missing Statement of Accuracy”), or
a statement that “under penalty of perjury . . . the complaining party is
authorized to act on behalf of the owner of an exclusive right that is
allegedly infringed” (“Missing Statement of Authorization”) (and
variations of these statements) (there being two separate requirements
in this formality), it will be flagged as missing that formality.148
All these flagged notices are then individually verified (thus
eliminating the problem of false positives).149 This analysis will
therefore pick up a subset of the notices with formalities which are not
in substantial compliance: the results from the analysis will represent
the lower bound of notices that are in error. This yields the following
table:

147
15 U.S.C. § 7006(5) incorporating the Electronic Signatures in Global and
National Commerce Act 2000, 114 Stat. 464 (“electronic signature” defined
as “an electronic sound, symbol, or process, attached to or logically associated
with a contract or other record and executed or adopted by a person with the
intent to sign the record”); Uniform Electronic Transactions Act 1999, § 2(8)
(“electronic signature” defined as “an electronic sound, symbol, or process
attached to or logically associated with a record and executed or adopted by a
person with the intent to sign the record.”).
148
Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1112 (9th Cir. 2007).
149
As there were fewer than 400 of such erroneous notices, it was possible to
conduct a manual verification of all the flagged notices. Note that the
verification process will not be able to determine false negative instances, e.g.
if there is a notice which does not have a signature, which the parsing process
does not flag as missing a signature. So understood, these figures represent the
minimum percentage of notices which are missing the formalities (the lower
bound): actual figures may be higher.
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2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

6

2,457

7,279

57,490

435,869

0
(0.000%)

15
(0.595%)

16
(0.215%)

151
(0.260%)

153
(0.035%)

0
(0.000%)

5
(0.198%)

I
(0.013%)

56
(0.097%)

69
(0.016%)

0
(0.000%)

4
(0.159%)

2
(0.027%)

50
(0.086%)

69
(0.016%)

0
(0.000%)

4
(0.159%)

3
(0.040%)

60
(0.104%)

70
(0.016%)

Table 3: Notices with Non-functional Formalities Errors (Signatures and
Attestations – items (i), (v) and (vi)) between 2008 and 2012 (N1=501,286)150

This study reveals quite a different picture since the 2006
Urban and Quilter study. Setting aside the figures for 2008 (at only six
notices in the dataset, there were too few of them to draw any definitive
conclusions), the figures show that the rate of errors for these nonfunctional formalities has decreased and is now extremely low, even as
the number of form-based takedown notices received by Google has
increased exponentially.151 Starting with 2009, out of 2,457 notices,
only 0.60% of Google’s form-based notices were missing signatures.152
In 2010, out of 7,279 Google notices, only 0.22% of them were missing
signatures.153 By 2012, out of 435,869 Google notices, only 0.035% of
them did not have signatures.154 So, notwithstanding an almost eightfold increase in notices from 2011 to 2012, the numbers of notices with
missing signatures showed an almost eight-fold decrease during the
same period.155
The rates of errors with the attestations show a similar
reduction. In 2009, 0.020% of all notices have a Missing Statement of

150

Results obtained by using MySQL to conduct on the first dataset a COUNT
of notices by their form, signatures, statements of good faith, statements of
accuracy and statements of authorization, for each of the years.
151
See supra Table 3.
152
See supra Table 3.
153
See supra Table 3.
154
See supra Table 3.
155
See supra Table 3.
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Good Faith, a Missing Statement of Accuracy or a Missing Statement
of Authorization attestation.156 By 2012, only 0.016% of these notices
have a Missing Statement of Good Faith, a Missing Statement of
Accuracy or a Missing Statement of Authorization attestation.157 So,
notwithstanding a 177-fold increase in notices received between 2009
and 2012, there has been a 10-fold decrease in notices with missing
attestations during the same period.158
That so many form-based notices would be free of “nonfunctional” formalities errors should not come as a surprise.159
Google’s form submission page requires the complainant to check
boxes acknowledging the accuracy of the notices, affirming her good
faith and her authority to act before the submission can be processed.160
In fact, the converse is surprising: that given the prevalence of web
form-based notices, there should be any notices at all with formal
errors. A manual review of notices with Missing Statement of Good
Faith, Missing Statement of Accuracy or Missing Statement of
Authorization attestations showed that many of these notices had
truncated contents, especially at the section which marked the
complainant’s sworn statements. If this is due to some form of
transmission or conversion error between Google and Chilling Effects,
the actual numbers of notices with “non-functional” formalities could
be lower.

156

See supra Table 3.
See supra Table 3.
158
See supra Table 3.
159
These results are validated by Urban’s updated study, which, in sampling
1,827 notices from 6 months of takedown notices submitted to the Chilling
Effects database in 2013 (amounting to a total of 108 million takedown
requests), found only “a handful of requests” which did not entirely conform
to the statutory requirements, and which found that all requests in their sample
were submitted through online forms. See Urban et al., supra note 33 at 93.
160
Google’s Web Search takedown form requires complainants to “check to
confirm” the aforesaid attestations. A failure to check the attestation fields
will produce an error message “Required field must not be blank” and the
takedown notice cannot be submitted. See Removing Content from Google,
GOOGLE: LEGAL HELP
https://support.google.com/legal/troubleshooter/1114905?hl=en#ts=9814647
%2C1115655%2C9814950%2C1115789%2C1117010%2C1697925 (select
Create Request to view form).
157
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D. Errors in Functional Formalities
What about notices with errors as regards the description of the
copyrighted work, the takedown request and the reporter’s contact
information—the functional formalities errors? As noted above,
notices which have functional formalities errors render them
substantially non-compliant and they cannot be subsequently rectified
by the reporter.
To analyze the notices with functional formalities errors,
notices in the second dataset will be parsed for missing entries for
identification of the copyright work, identification of the infringed
material and identification of the reporter. Because a notice may
comprise several complaints of infringement of copyright works for the
same copyright owner or licensee, where a complaint is missing any
description of the copyright work, this study will flag the complaint
(and the notice in its entirety)161 as non-compliant, because, in such a
case, it is not possible to relate the supplied takedown requests in the
complaint to the infringed copyright work. An example of such a notice
(with information as to the description of the copyrighted work and the
original URL of the copyrighted work) is as follows:

161

It may be argued that the failure to include a description for the copyright
work only invalidates that complaint, but not the entire notice. However, the
attestation, under penalty of perjury, that “the information in the notification
is accurate” relates to the entire notice, and not just to the complaint. 17 U.S.C.
§ 512(c)(3)(A)(ii). In addition, the concept of a “complaint” is not recognized
in the DMCA: it is a tool of convenience created by online service providers,
predominantly, Google Inc., to facilitate the submission of takedown notices
for reporters representing copyright owners for a large group of works. See
infra text accompanying note 16.
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Re: Websearch Infringement Notification via Online Form Complaint
SENT VIA; ONLINE FORM

NOTICE TYPE:

DMCA

Copyright claim #1
Unspecified

l>ISt ""'"
0

GINALURl.S:

ALLEGEDLY
I NFRINGING URLS:

No topyrlghted URLs wete submitted.
01 pastebin.com • 5 URls
o;; www.filesspy.com - 4 URLs

o: rapidsharega mes.net - 4 URls
rapidlibrary.com - 4 URls
os. www.1inktury.com - 3 URls

Figure 1: Example of Notice with Empty Copyright Work Description:
Notice 130280 dated June 15, 2012, submitted by leakID to Google162

Where the complaint does not have a takedown request or URI,
it (and the notice in its entirety) will be flagged as missing information
that identifies and enables the location of the infringing work.163 The
most typical example of such a notice is one that has a complaint
without any takedown request relating to the work. The following
notice (with missing information as to the “Allegedly Infringing
URLs”) is an example:

162

Websearch Infringement Notification via Online Form Complaint, LUMEN
(June 15, 2012), https://lumendatabase.org/notices/130280#.
163
See Seng, supra note 19, at 401–04.
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DMCA (Copyright) Complaint to Google
SENDER

RECIPIENT

Harsh Pat el

Google, Inc. [Adse nse)

[Private)

[Private)

',. us

Mountain View, CA., 94043, US

Se"II on June 06, 20· 1

Re: Infringement Notification via Adsense Complaint
Sf NT VIA; ONLINE FORM: FORM

NOTICE TYPE:

DMCA

Copyright claim #1
KIND OF WORK:

Unspecified

DESCRIPTION

The wo rk is a set of instructions completely written by me. All images and text on the si te are
copyrigh ted. In the footer of each page (including the page of the copyrighted work) includes
this sta tement "No part of this blog or Its feed may be repu blished without the written consent
of the author." The foo ter also includes a link titled lega l Info. The li nked page (
http://ipodtoucher5S.blogspot.com/2008/11/1egal-notice.html)<http://www.google.com/url7
sa==D&q==http%3A%2F%2Flpodtoucher55.blogspot.com%2F2008%2 F11%2Flega l-not lce.html)>
includes more infor mation on the copyright of the entire site.

ORIGINAL URLS:

www.google.com • 1 URL
ipodtoucherSS.blogspot.com • 1 URL

No nfrlnging URl.s were submitted,
~ to request access and see full URL.s.

JUR ISDICTIONS

Unspecified

Origi nal Documents

Figure 2: Example of Notice with Complaint without Takedown Request:
Notice 152065 dated Jun. 6, 2011, submitted by Harsh Patel to Google164

Bearing in mind the distinction noted above between notices
and complaints, the following table sets out the statistics for all Google
notices and their complaints that potentially exhibit functional errors:

164

Websearch Infringement Notification via Online Form Complaint, LUMEN
(Jun. 6, 2011), https://lumendatabase.org/notices/152065.
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2011

2012

2013
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2014

2015

All Google
212,394
2,375,073
21,939,895
29,105,686
34,238,388
Takedown
complaints
complaints
complaints
complaints
complaints
Notices: notices/
102,176
512,143
551,048
822,670
1,246,755
complaints

notices

No Copyright
Work
Description item (ii)
(% of All
Google)

8,386
complaints
(3.95%)

As Above + No
Copyright
Work URLs (% of All
Google/% of
No Copyright
Work
Description)
No Takedown
Request in any
complaint - item
(iii)
(% of All
Google)

5,941
complaints
(2.80%/70.8%)

4,851
notices
(4.75%)

3,761
notices
(3.68%/77.5%)
12,288
complaints
(5.79%)
9,801
notices
(9.59%)

notices

f

121,053
complaints
(5.10%)
37,467
notices
(7.32%)
119,699
complaints
(5.04%/98.9%)
36,119
notices
(7.05%/96.4%)
134,750
complaints
(5.67%)
43,454
notices
(8.48%)

notices

1,288,178
complaints
(5.87%)
52,720
notices
(9.57%)
1,287,968
complaints
(5.87%/100%)
52,513
notices
(9.53%/99.6%)
1,317,585
complaints
(6.01%)
68,175
notices
(12.4%)

notices

992,280
complaints
(3.41%)
47,827
notices
(5.81%)
990,530
complaints
(3.40%/99.8%)

notices

2,036
complaints
(0.006%)
593
notices
(0.048%)
198
complaints
(0.001%/9.72%)

47,487
198
notices
notices
(5.77%/99.3%) (0.016%/33.4%)
1,585,618
complaints
(5.45%)
93,564
notices
(11.4%)

1,637,288
complaints
(4.78%)
91,291
notices
(7.32%)

As Above +
3,250
113,489
1,297,429
1,544,496
1,604,323
TCRP senders
complaints
complaints
complaints
complaints
complaints
only
(1.53%/26.4%)
(4.78%/84.2%)
(5.91%/98.5%)
(5.31%/97.4%)
(4.69%/98.0%)
(% of All
1,346
32,710
53,099
79,933
80,044
Google/% of
No Takedown
notices
notices
notices
notices
notices
Request)
(1.32%/13.7%)
(6.39%/75.3%)
(9.64%/77.9%)
(9.72%/85.4%)
(6.42%/87.7%)

Table 4: Notices with Formal Errors (items (ii) and (iii)) between 2011 and
2015 (N2=3,299,265)165

The numbers above can be better shown in the following graphs.

165

Results obtained by using MySQL to conduct on the second dataset a
COUNT of complaints for each notice for each year based on the various
criteria – missing copyright work descriptions (with missing URLs to describe
the copyright work) and missing requests (with senders who are TCRP
participants).
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Complaints/Notices with No Copyright Work Description
18.0%

1,800

16.0%

1,600

14.0%

1,400

12.0%

1,200

~
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C

~
::,
0

10.0%
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1,000

8.0%

800

6.0%

600

4.0%

400

2.0%

200

0.0%

0

2011
-

2012
% Complaints

2013
-

% Notices

2014
- - Complai nts

2015
- - Notices

Figure 3: Plot of Percentage of Notices and Complaints with No Copyright
Work Descriptions between 2011 and 2015166

The statistics show that there are substantial numbers of noncompliant complaints that fail to supply a copyright work description.
The percentage of non-compliant complaints rose from 3.95%
(representing 4.75% of notices) in 2011 to 5.87% (representing 9.57%
of notices) in 2013, before falling to 3.41% (representing 5.81% of
notices) in 2014, and further to 0.006% (representing 0.048% of
notices) in 2015.167 Given that Google’s current online forms for
submitting takedown requests mandate that this information be

166
167

See supra Table 4.
See supra Figure 3.
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supplied,168 it is surprising that there are submitted notices which fail
to comply with this formality.169
Complaints/Notices with No Takedown Requests
18.0%

1,800

16.0%

1,600

:;:

14.0%

1,400

l

12.0%

1,200

10.0%

1,000
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C:

:,

8.0%

800

6.0%

600

4.0%

400

2.0%

200

0.0%

0

2011

-

2012

%Complaints

2013

-

%Notices

2014

-

Complaints

2015

-

Notices

Figure 4: Plot of Percentage of Notices and Complaints with No Takedown
Requests between 2011 and 2015170

Nor is the situation any much better in relation to information
for identifying the allegedly infringing material. As Table 4:4 shows,
the reporters did not fare very well here either. It is found that 9.59%
of notices in 2011 have one or more complaints that do not have any
168

Urban’s updated study opined that webforms used by Google would
increase the likelihood that the required formalities were observed. Urban et
al., supra note 33, at 93. The introduction of tightened rules for submitting
takedown notices might explain the sharp reduction in notices and complaints
without copyright work descriptions in 2015. But as Urban’s study only
examined notices in 2013, the results above represent the first quantitative
evidence of the positive effects of such submission rules that strictly enforce
the DMCA formalities. However, it might also be contended that if the
submission rules were tightened, there should be no instances of complaints
or notices with no copyright work descriptions. The presence of a small
number of such notices/complaints might be because these were submitted
before the tightened submission rules were implemented in 2015.
169
By cross-referencing the same notice as found on the first dataset (from the
Chilling Effects repository) and the second dataset (from the Lumen
repository), it can be shown that the same notices that do not have any
copyright descriptions across both datasets and both repositories. Of course,
one possible, but unlikely, explanation for this is that the contents of the same
notices were corrupted when published onto both repositories. It is submitted
that the better explanation is that these are real mistakes made by reporters.
170
See supra Table 4.
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valid URI information, rising to 12.37% in 2013 before falling to
7.32% in 2015.171
If a complaint is missing the description of the copyright work,
it may be argued that the failure to include a description for the
copyright work only invalidates that complaint and its underlying
requests, but not the entire notice. On this view, the other complaints
with complete descriptions and requests remain valid. The better view
starts with the observation that only Google and Twitter give reporters
the option to submit multiple complaints for each notice.172 Reporters
do submit single-complaint notices to Google and Twitter, and if they
submit multiple complaints in one notice out of expediency, they must
also take the burden of ensuring that all the complaints in that one
notice are accurate. After all, all reporters have to support each notice
with the attestation, under penalty of perjury, that “the information in
the notification is accurate” (statement of accuracy).173 Enabling a
reporter to select some complaints and the attestation for the notice as
support for a notification that is substantially compliant shades into the
objection against enabling a reporter to put together a complaint notice
from separately defective notices as this would unduly burden the
service provider.174 As the court in Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC
noted, “the text of § 512(c)(3) requires that the notice be ‘a written
communication.’”175 Thus, it is submitted that a complaint that is
missing the copyright work description should be rendered noncompliant and so should its parent notice.
It is submitted that a complaint with no takedown request will
taint not only that complaint, but the entire notice and all its associated
complaints (which may have takedown requests), for the same reasons
outlined above. A complaint without any request takes away the raison
d’etre for the notice, which is an “accusation[] of alleged infringement”

171

See supra Table 4.
Results obtained by using MySQL to conduct on the second dataset a
COUNT of notices that have more than one complaint and isolating the
recipient names for such notices.
173
17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(vi).
174
Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1112–13 (9th Cir. 2007).
175
Id. at 1113 (observing that this requirement for the notice to be one single
written communication instead of separate communications is not a mere
technicality as otherwise, this would require the service provider to piece
together the relevant information for each instance of claimed infringement,
which would shift a substantial burden of policing and documenting the
infringement away from the copyright owner to the service provider).
172
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that the service provider is obliged to act on to “start potentially
invasive proceedings.”176 It bears emphasis that every notification has
to be supported by the reporter’s statement of accuracy and a statement
of his good faith belief that “use of the material in the manner
complained of is not authorized by the copyright owner, its agent, or
the law”177 (the statement of good faith belief). A notice with some
complaints that have no takedown requests will leave the service
provider uncertain about the provenance of the reporter’s good faith
belief about the entire notice, and unclear about the possible knowledge
imputed to the provider from the rest of the complaints in the notice.178
There is some anecdotal evidence that these errors could be
attributed to the unsophisticated reporter. For instance, with some types
of takedown forms,179 individual reporters may not know what a URI
is.180 Some supply only descriptive information in place of a URI.181
Others are confused by the requirement to supply not only the URI of
the “infringing material in the catalog” (the reference to “catalog” is
totally misleading), but also the URI of “the infringing third party
content that the blog is linking to” (this refers to third party material
that is linked to the page complained of as above). This has led to no
end of confusion for some individual reporters,182 many of whom have

176

Id. at 1112.
17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(v).
178
17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(B)(i) (imputing to the service provider actual
knowledge or awareness of facts or circumstances of infringing activity from
a substantially compliant notification).
179
Notably, the non-Google Search forms.
180
See, e.g., Blog DMCA (Copyright) Complaint to Google, CHILLING
EFFECTS (June 7, 2011) (on file with author) (stating that for the field that
requires the reporter to enter the “Location (URL) of infringing material in the
catalog,” the reporter entered, “It's only on your server.”); see also, e.g., Music
DMCA (Copyright) Complaint to Google, CHILLING EFFECTS (Nov. 10, 2012)
(on file with author) (stating that the reporter entered “google” when asked to
supply the “URL of the allegedly infringing material in our search results”).
181
See, e.g., DMCA (Copyright) Complaint to Google, CHILLING EFFECTS
(Oct. 29, 2012) (on file with author) (stating “daddyfunplace 'chubby in mini
speedo' safe search off” when asked to supply the “URL of the allegedly
infringing material in our search results:”).
182
See, e.g., Music DMCA (Copyright) Complaint to Google, CHILLING
EFFECTS (May 4, 2010) (on file with author) (stating that for the field that
requires the reporter to enter the “Location (URL) of infringing third party
content that the blog is linking to,” the reporter entered, “I don't know what in
hell this means . . .”).
177
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vented their frustrations in the notice itself.183 This suggests that the
unsophisticated users do require some instruction as to what constitutes
a valid URI in a takedown request.
But the figures in Table 4 confirm that almost all of these
notices with “no URI” complaints are issued by “trusted users”—
sophisticated reporters who are participants of Google's Trusted
Copyright Removal Program,184 rather than the “unsophisticated”
users.185 TCRP users are responsible for an increasing number of “no
URI” complaints over the period between 2011 and 2015, going from
issuing 26.4% of all “no URI” complaints in 2011 to 98.0% of all “no
URI” complaints 2015, as the following graph below demonstrates.

183

See, e.g., Book DMCA (Copyright) Complaint to Google, CHILLING
EFFECTS (June 10, 2011) (on file with author) (stating that the reporter entered
“DON’T KNOW WHAT THIS MEANS OR HWO [sic] TO ADDRESS IT”);
see also, e.g., eBooks DMCA (Copyright) Complaint to Google, CHILLING
EFFECTS (Apr. 26, 2011) (on file with author) (stating that the reporter entered
“Find it yourself, mother******!” when asked to supply the “URL of the
allegedly infringing material in our search results:”); see also, e.g., DMCA
(Copyright) Complaint to Google, CHILLING EFFECTS (Feb. 3, 2011) (on file
with author) (stating “f*** that, your job to sort that” when similarly asked to
supply the “URL of the allegedly infringing material in our search results:”).
184
See Seng, supra note 19, at 414–18.
185
Of course, trusted users can elect to serve Search notices on Google without
signing in as trusted users. But this would be unlikely since there is no real
advantage in doing so.
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Figure 5: Plot of Percentage of Notices and Complaints with No Takedown
Requests (by TCRP Reporters) between 2011 and 2015186

The following table breaks down these “empty request”
complaints by the top reporters, including trusted users.

186

See supra Table 4.
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Reporter

1. BPI (British Recorded
Music Industry) Ltd•
2. Recording Industry
Association of America,
Inc.•
3. AudioLock.NET*

Total
Total Notices
No.of Empty
Complaints
Issued
Request Complaints
Issued
(B)
(C)
(A)
(% of Total
Complaints =
(C)/(A))
46,254,807
3 11 ,354
2,791,927
(6.04%)
19,568,599
24,603
455 ,828
(2.33%)

3,437,438

839,986

4. Mark Ayling•

2,211 ,693

5,485

s.

1,943,589

19,741

6. Digimarc•

1,933,016

171 ,736

7. Unidam, Inc.•

1,276,036

22,771

8. Link-Busters•

1, 139,533

76,102

9. MUSO.com Anti-piracy•

Stichting BREIN*

19,196
(0.56%)
4,073
(0.18%)
3,950
/0.20%)
109,674
(5.67%)
33,355
(2.61 %)
197,600
07.3%)
80,180
(7.95%)
15,403
11.89%)
56,745
(8.99%)
4,034
(0.65%)
1,476
/0.25%)
2,638
(0.46%)
19,7 16
(4.65%)
134,452
(37.0%)

161
No. of Notices with Empty
Request Complaints
(D)
(% of Total Notices
= (D)/(B))

89,129
(28.6%)
14,625
(59.4%)
12,458
(1.48%)
601
(11.0%)
2, 131
/10.8%)
26,814
(15.6%)
4,967
(21.8%)
25,232
133.2%)
23, 145
(10.9%)
4,453
13.19%)
8,866
(25.5%)
1,898
(2.98%)
513
13.45%)
1,706
(2.20%)
644
13.42%)
3,222
(77.6%)

1,008,703

212,894

10. Degban•

817,074

139,675

II. Vobile Inc•

631 ,370

34,838

12. Counterfeit.Technology•

624,715

63,731

13. IP-Echelon Pty Ltd•

601,669

14,868

14. proMedia

570,285

77,502

IS. Attributor•

423,910

18,838

16. Associaciio Antipirataria
Cinema e Musica*

363,388

4,155

17. Remove Your Media
LLC*

354246

21247

970
(0.27%)

289
(1.36%)

18. CAPIF*

293, 199

5,365

19. The Publishers
Association•
20. APCM Mexico•

280960

11455

257,324

3,686

122,982
(41.9%)
62,034
(22.1%)
158,178
(61.5%)

2,918
(54.4%)
5,640
(49.2%)
3,014
(81.8%)

Table 5: Top 20 Reporters by complaints, listing the total numbers of
complaints, notices, empty request complaints and notices with empty
request complaints between 2011 and 2015 (N2=3,299,265); TCRP members
are marked with *; those with 5% or more empty requests are boldfaced.187

The top transgressor who has sent out the most “empty
request” complaints between 2011 and 2015 is BPI.188 At over 2.7

187

Results obtained by using MySQL to conduct on the second dataset a
COUNT of notices and complaints that have either no requests or empty
requests, sorted by the top 20 reporters, and combining that with a COUNT of
the total number of notices and complaints for these reporters.
188
See supra Table 5.
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million complaints, this is over six times more than the next largest
transgressor, RIAA, over five years.189 And it has done so repeatedly,
since almost 3 in 10 of its notices are notices containing complaints
with empty requests.190 In fact, as can be seen from the table, of the top
twenty reporters who have issued the largest number of complaints
between 2011 and 2015, almost half have 5% or more of empty request
complaints, and all of these reporters fit the profile of TCRP “trusted”
users.191
This looks less like an isolated incident and more like an
industry phenomenon and calls for some explanation. One possible
explanation192 is that that there were originally takedown requests
associated with these “empty request” complaints, but they were
“culled” by the reporter prior to submission.193 The heavily-redacted

189

See supra Table 5.
See supra Table 5.
191
The 5% cut-off is chosen because it is the most usual statistical significance
level selected for rejecting the null hypothesis. As Lumen does not preserve
information on whether a particular sender is a trusted user, suspected TCRP
reporters are flagged as such based on their volume of complaints and requests
that exceed the allowable limits in Google’s webforms that are available to the
general public. (Currently the limits are up to 10 complaints per notice and up
to 1,000 takedown requests per complaint: see Copyright Removal, GOOGLE,
at
https://www.google.com/webmasters/tools/legal-removalrequest?hl=en&pid=0&complaint_type=1 which permits up to 10 “groups” of
complaints (see supra note 161), each of which relates to one copyright work,
and permits the entry of up to 1000 infringing URLs (one URL per line)).
192
Another possible explanation is that reporters were seeking to cast on the
service providers “apparent knowledge” of possible infringing activity by
identifying and thereby flagging the copyrighted works and leaving it to the
service providers to locate the infringing materials. Such an explanation, while
plausible, would be rejected by the courts. See Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC,
488 F.3d 1102, 1113 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding as ineffective notices that
separately supply the ownership information, the description of the work and
the work location, on the basis that the DMCA notification procedures “place
the burden of policing copyright infringement—identifying the potentially
infringing material and adequately documenting infringement—squarely on
the owners of the copyright” and that such notices will not cast any knowledge
of infringement on the service providers because they are ineffective).
193
See, e.g., BPI DMCA (Copyright) Complaint to Google, CHILLING EFFECTS
(Nov. 2, 2012) (on file with author) (making nine substantive complaints but
putting in takedown requests for only two of these complaints); see also, e.g.,
Music DMCA (Copyright) Complaint to Google, CHILLING EFFECTS (Dec. 18,
2012) (on file with author) (making ten complaints but only four come with
takedown requests).
190
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declaration of David Kaplan in Disney Enterprises, Inc. v. Hotfile
Corp.194 describes this as part of the decision making process on the
part of reporters to avoid sending notices on misidentified content,
whose effect is “a system that, by design, favors excluding [the take
down of infringing] files rather than potentially misidentifying files.”195
While this is commendable, it also behooves reporters to
completely remove these non-actionable complaints from their
submitted notices. A failure to remove them may invite allegations that
the good faith and accuracy attestations have been breached, and
suggestions that TCRP users are cavalier in detecting infringement and
respecting the sanctity of their own takedown complaints.
Top 30 Reporters (by Total Complaints issued) & % of "Empty Request" Complaints
50
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O % Empty Complaints
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Figure 6: Top 30 Reporters by Total Complaints issued and % of “empty
request” complaints between 2011 and 2015 (N2=3,299,265)196

Lest it be contended that empty requests are unavoidable or
that empty requests represent a trade-off between volume and
precision, one must single out Stichting BREIN (0.20%),
194

Declaration of David Kaplan in Support of Warner Bros. Entertainment’s
Motion for Summary Judgment, at 5, Disney Enter., Inc. v. Hotfile Corp., No
1:11-cv-20427-KMW (S.D. Fla. Feb. 28, 2012), ECF No. 308-1,
https://cases.justia.com/federal/districtcourts/florida/flsdce/1:2011cv20427/373206/308/1.pdf?ts=1376979552.
195
Id.
196
The chart is a graphical representation of
Table 5, applying the same methodology but extending it to the top 30
reporters by total complaints.
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AudioLock.NET (0.56%), Degban (1.89%) and RIAA (2.33%) for
commendation.197 Not only do they have the lowest ratio of empty
request complaints to complaints among the reporters, they have done
so while amongst the top 10 reporters of takedown complaints between
2011 to 2015 (at 1.94 million, 3.44 million, 0.82 million and 19.6
million complaints respectively), not far behind BPI (at 46.3 million
complaints).198 This is more than ample demonstration that empty
request complaints are avoidable by reporters and can easily be fixed
by introducing a simple adjustment to the reporters’ systems prior to
submission of the takedown requests.
E. Summary
In sum, adopting a conservative test which narrowly equates a
missing formality with statutory non-compliance, the above analysis
shows that there is a sharp legal and empirical difference between the
functional formalities and the non-functional formalities in notices.
While non-functional formalities exhibit a low error rate of 0.02% (up
to 2012),199 functional formalities exhibit a much higher error rate that
averages to 3.7% (for complaints with missing copyright work
descriptions) and 5.5% (for complaints with empty takedown
requests).200 If a complaint exhibiting functional errors is considered to
taint the parent notice, the error rates average to 5.5% (for notices with
missing copyright work descriptions) and 9.8% (for notices with empty
takedown requests).201 It will be noted that the errors with the
functional formalities, which are the critical elements of a takedown
notice, are several orders of magnitude higher than the errors with nonfunctional formalities. Furthermore, while errors with non-functional
formalities are on the decline,202 owing to the use of form-based
notices, errors with functional formalities have at best kept stable
within the same range,203 suggesting that the divergence between the

197

See supra Figure 6.
See supra Figure 6.
199
See supra Table 3; see supra note 149.
200
See supra Table 4; see Websearch Infringement Notification via Online
Form Complaint, supra note 162.
201
See supra Table 4; see Websearch Infringement Notification via Online
Form Complaint, supra note 162.
202
See supra the discussion immediately following Table 3; see supra note
150.
203
See supra the discussion immediately following Table 4.
198
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error rates of non-functional formalities and functional formalities has
since grown further.
At one level, this difference can be explained as one of form
(non-functional formalities) over substance (functional formalities),
with the former going to the signatures and the prescribed attestations,
and the latter going to the notice claims and takedown requests. As
such, it is natural to expect the errors in functional formalities to be
higher.204
That may be so. But even then, the magnitude of these
functional errors still gives cause for concern. Copyright owners and
reporters may argue that errors in takedown notices are an inevitable
byproduct of enforcement, as they represent a tradeoff between
accuracy and efficiency.205 But inaccuracies manifesting themselves as
errors also represent a cost: not just the service provider's cost of
processing but also a cost to the copyright owner (and less so, for the
reporter)206 because they represent a missed enforcement opportunity.
Also, it has to be remembered that in this part of the paper, we are only
concerned with formality errors, and not even substantive errors. Since
errors in the form of missing formalities are totally preventable at very
low cost, errors such as those examined above should not even count
as enforcement errors because they are really process errors—errors
introduced in the administration and processing of takedown notices
and requests. There is simply no-good reason why the same processes
that have minimized (if not eliminated) the errors in non-functional
formalities could not be applied to eliminate the same errors with
functional formalities.
204
See supra note 145 for a discussion about Google’s form submission page
which requires that the submitted notices be “checked” for compliance with
the non-functional formalities such as attestations before the notice can be
submitted. On the other hand, substantive information has to be supplied for
the functional formalities. It should be noted that even though Google’s Web
Search takedown form (now) checks each submitted notice for the requisite
reporter information, copyright work description, location of infringing
material (URL) and signature fields (and declines to accept submissions
without these fields), it should be questioned whether those notices with
missing descriptions or missing requests were submitted through this interface
(which would have disallowed such submissions) or through a different
interface set up for TCRP reporters.
205
See e.g., Disney Enterprises, Inc. v. Hotfile Corp., 2013 WL 6336286 at
*14 (S.D. Florida, 2013).
206
There may be a question as to whether a reporter is paid by the owner if the
takedown request is rejected by the service provider.
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SUBSTANTIVE ERRORS IN TAKEDOWN NOTICES

So far, the study has focused on an examination of errors
associated with the failure to comply with the functional and nonfunctional formalities in the DMCA. If formality errors taint at least
5.5% of takedown notices, what proportion of substantive errors—
errors that raise substantive legal questions which go to the underlying
claim for alleged copyright infringement—will afflict the notices? In
the Urban and Quilter study, the authors found that at least one third of
all notices (N=876) manually reviewed were erroneous because the
claims were over non-copyrightable subject matter or raised fair use
and other substantive defenses,207 a statistic that remained relatively
stable in the updated study.208 In the decade after the passage of the
DMCA, has the situation improved?
On closer examination of the issue, it turns out that in order to
assess if there are substantive errors in a takedown notice, a detailed
evaluation of the notice contents as well as the targeted hosting page is
required. However, since 2008, the use of online forms and “robotakedowns” has prevailed.209 With substantial investments into systems
for processing these takedowns by service providers,210 this has
paradoxically shortened turnaround times for responding to takedown
notices and their requests.211 For instance, Google indicates that it
responds to takedown requests within 24 hours of their submission.212
And generally, cyberlocker and other web hosting sites respond to such
requests in a matter of days.213 When the takedown notice is eventually

207

Urban & Quilter, supra note 30, at 666–67.
Urban et al., supra note 33, at 88.
209
See Seng, supra note 19, at 398–400.
210
Section 512 Study, supra note 17, at 81865.
211
See e.g., Kent Walker, Making Copyright Work Better Online, GOOGLE
(Dec. 2, 2010), https://publicpolicy.googleblog.com/2010/12/makingcopyright-work-better-online.html (noting that Google would build tools to
improve and shorten the time for processing of takedown notices).
212
See, e.g., FAQ – Google Transparency Report, GOOGLE,
http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/removals/copyright/faq/#respons
e_time (last visited May 11, 2015) (noting that as of December 2012, the
average processing time for all removal requests submitted via web forms for
Search is approximately 6 hours).
213
The DMCA is Broken…, THE TRICHORDIST (July 18, 2012),
http://thetrichordist.com/2012/07/18/the-dmca-is-broken/ (noting that most
208
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published on Chilling Effects or Lumen about 1 week later, it is more
often the case that both the targeted link (takedown request) and the
hosting page have been disabled. These two reasons together make it
infeasible to examine and evaluate each notice for its underlying
substantive copyright claims.214
To this end, in this study, it is proposed to evaluate the notices
for their underlying substantive copyright claims indirectly by focusing
on two narrow issues. The first is that an effective notice has to properly
identify the copyright work and the copyright owner or exclusive
licensee of rights in that work. After all, the statement of the reporter’s

cyberlocker sites remove the allegedly offending material between 24 and 48
hours); How to File DMCA Takedown Notice, PIRACYTAKEDOWN (May 1,
2014), http://piracytakedown.com/blog/dmca-takedown-notice (noting that
most cyberlockers will remove infringing content in less than 2 days after
receiving takedown notices); Tobias Lauinger et al., Clickonomics:
Determining the Effect of Anti-Piracy Measures for One-Click Hosting,
PROCEEDINGS OF NDSS SYMPOSIUM 2013 (2013) (empirically finding that
most cyberlockers lapse old content after 30 days) [hereinafter Clickonomics].
For a more extreme example, the cyberlocker site Hotfile gave a content
provider, Warner Bros., access to a “takedown tool” which allowed Warner as
a trusted content owner to access Hotfile’s system to identify and
automatically remove offending links without any action by Hotfile. See
Disney Enter., Inc. v. Hotfile Corp., No. 11-20427-CIV, 2013 WL 6336286,
at 11 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 20, 2013).
214
In the Urban updated study, the investigation into substantive errors was
conducted by an ex-post manual quantitative examination of a random sample
of 1,827 Lumen takedown notices issued between May and October 2013, by
reviewing the notices against Google Web Search index entries and Google
Image Services thumbnails. The issue with this methodology is that given the
lapse of time (the review itself took place most likely at least after February
2014 (Urban et al., supra note 33, at 78 n.209), this examination can only be
conducted on online resources that have remained accessible and available at
least 4 months after the takedowns were issued. These will tend to be resources
whose uses are not illicit or are authorised fair use. Therefore, the availability
of the resource itself for review into substantive errors creates a selection bias
known as survivorship bias that skews the ensuing investigation and analysis
in favour of the finding that there is a higher incidence of substantive errors
(since no investigations can be conducted into resources that are
presumptively illicit or unlicensed and have been removed). The findings of
the Urban updated study therefore represent the higher bound of the extent of
substantive errors in takedown notices. For an explanation of survivorship
bias, see Katy Milkman, The Perils of “Survivorship Bias”, SCIENTIFIC
AMERICAN (Feb. 11, 2020), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/theperils-of-survivorship-bias/ (last visited Feb 8, 2021).
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good faith belief is that the “use of the [described copyright] material
in the manner complained of is not authorized by the copyright owner,
its agent, or the law.”215 The reporter also attests to the fact that “the
information in the notification is accurate.”216 The second is that an
effective takedown request has to refer to an ostensibly valid allegation
of infringing activity, consistently with the reporter’s attested statement
that the “use of the material in the manner complained of not
authorized,”217 and that “the information in the notification is
accurate”218 and that the reporter’s notification is targeting an
exclusive right that is allegedly infringed.”219 These two issues are
certainly not exhaustive of all the substantive legal issues relating to a
takedown notice. But, as will be shown later, they are tractable, given
the large volumes of notices in the dataset, and their results are
illuminative.
A. Notices that Misidentify the Copyright Owner
There has been anecdotal evidence of the numerous instances
where reporters have wrongly claimed on behalf of copyright owners’
infringements over works to which they do not own copyright.220 Such
evidence has ceased to be purely anecdotal. In the Disney Enterprises,
Inc. v. Hotfile Corp. litigation, it was successfully alleged that Warner
Brothers as a content provider had (apparently) sought to remove files
that undisputedly belonged to Electronic Arts, Inc.,221 and had
(intentionally) sought to remove a free software program,
JDownloader, that was created by a German company, for which
Warner does not own or have rights to.222 In the Hotfile litigation, the
scale of such infractions was small—the former involved 271 requests
and the latter involved 8 requests.223 Nonetheless, they sufficed to
enable Hotfile to maintain its counter-claim against Warner Brothers
for misrepresentation under the DMCA; with the court ruling that
215

17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(v) (emphasis added).
17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(vi) (emphasis added).
217
17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(v) (emphasis added).
218
17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(vi) (emphasis added).
219
Id.
220
See supra notes 38–41 and accompanying text.
221
Disney Enter., Inc. v. Hotfile Corp., No. 11-20427-CIV, 2013 WL
6336286, at 15 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 20, 2013) (noting that Electronic Arts, Inc.
subsequently gave Warner after-the-fact permission to remove the files).
222
Id.
223
Id. at 17.
216
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“there is sufficient evidence in the record to suggest that Warner
intentionally targeted files it knew it had no right to remove.”224
In the course of conducting this study on the first dataset
through the Chilling Effects database,225 at least two more instances of
infractions of the same type were found, albeit on a much larger scale.
In the first instance, NBCUniversal’s takedown notices
wrongly described one “B****** P******” as the copyright owner in
its notices. As a result, a total of 169 notices, comprising a total of
132,299 requests, were served on Google between August and
December 2011.226 A summary of these erroneous notices and requests
follows:
Month/Year

No.of Total No. Total No.
Notices
of
of
Requests Requests
Submitted Reected
49
Aug. 2 to Aug.
37,072
889
30, 2011

DMCA
Section

Identified
Copyright
Owner

s5 12(d)

e••••••

Sep. I to Sep.
28, 2011

42

36,803

998

s5 12(d)

Oct. 2 to Oct.
II , 2011

30

19,818

272

s5 12(d)

Nov. I to Nov.
22, 20 11

40

32,636

968

s5 12(d)

Dec. 6 to Dec.
8, 2011

8

5,970

4

s5 12(d)

p••····
a••••••
p••····
a••••••
p••····
a••••••
p••····
e••••••
p••····

Actual
Copyright
Owner
( resumed)
NBCUniversal

Reporter

Google
Service

NBCUniversal

Search

NBCUniversal

NBCU niversal

Search

NBCUniversal

NBCUniversal

Search

NBCUniversal

NBCUniversal

Search

NBCUniversal

NBCUniversal

Search

Table 6: NBCUniversal's Erroneous Takedown Requests227

As the reporter, NBCUniversal had attested in the notices that
the 132,299 requests covered in the table above pertained to the use of
infringing materials which were not authorized by the copyright owner
“B****** P******” and that it had authority from “B******
P******” to act to remove these requests.228 It would not be apparent

224

Id. at 48.
See generally LUMEN, supra note 54. During a verification of the above
results with the Lumen database, an interesting divergence was noted. While
the number of notices misidentifying “B****** P******” as a copyright
owner had remained similar (with 250 notices containing 188,488
complaints), the number of notices misidentifying “P**** T******” had
dropped drastically to 1 notice. The reasons for the discrepancy between the
Chilling Effects and Lumen databases are currently unknown.
226
See infra Table 6.
227
Results obtained by using MySQL to conduct on the first dataset a search
for “B****** P******” in the contents of copy of the original, complete and
unredacted notice.
228
These are standard attestations made in every takedown request. See 17
U.S.C. §§ 512(c)(3)(A)(v)–(vi).
225
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to a reviewer of these notices that “B****** P******” was one of
NBCUniversal’s employees.229 Of these, Google only rejected 3,131 of
these takedown requests (a rejection rate of only 2.37%).230
In the second instance, it was found, on the first dataset, that
the reporting agent Marketly.com, which has been described as an
Internet agent set up by an ex-Microsoft employee “P**** T******”
to manage Microsoft’s anti-piracy program,231 described himself in no
less than 1,114 notices as the copyright owner of Microsoft software
and games in its takedown notices between June and September
2011.232 Again, as above, there was no reason to associate the exMicrosoft employee with ownership of the copyright in Microsoft
software and games. The numbers of affected requests are as follows:
Month/Year No.of Total No. Total No. DMCA Identified
Actual
Reporter Google
of
of
Section Copyright Copy-right
Service
Notices
Requests Requests
Owner
Owner
(presumed)
Submitted Rejected
Jun. 13 to Jun.
23
13,447
s512(d)
P****
Microsoft Marketly Search
951
30, 2011
T******
Corp.
.com
Jul. 1 to Jul.
31 , 2011
Aug. 1 to
Aug.31 , 2011
Sep. 1 to Sep.
26, 2011

244

112,970

504

s512(d)

393

32,714

827

s512(d)

457

100,600

668

s512(d)

P****
T******
P****
T******

Microsoft
Corp.
Microsoft
Corp.

Marketly
Marketly
.com

Search

P****
T******

Microsoft
Corp.

Marketly
.com

Search

Search

.com

Table 7: Marketly.com's Erroneous Takedown Requests233

All in, more than ¼ million takedown requests were issued
under these erroneous notices.234 Of these 259,731 requests, Google

229

A LinkedIn search verified the relationship between “B****** P******”
and NBCUniversal. The link to the LinkedIn search for “B****** P******”
would not be supplied in order to protect the personal identity of this
individual.
230
See supra Table 6.
231
Cyrus Farivar, Microsoft Outsources Copyright Enforcement to Small
(May
29,
2012),
Redmond
Company,
ARSTECHNICA
http://arstechnica.com/business/2012/05/microsoft-outsources-copyrightenforcement-to-small-redmond-company/ (stating that Marketly was founded
by a former Microsoft employee with no legal background).
232
Results obtained by using MySQL to conduct on the first dataset a search
for “P**** T******” in the contents of copy of the original, complete and
unredacted notice.
233
Id.
234
See supra Table 7.
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only rejected 2,950 of them, which works out to a rejection rate of only
1.14%.235
For reasons explained above,236 these notices amounted to
potential misrepresentations on the part of the reporter and are
actionable by the recipient service provider. These are not correctable,
non-functional formalities errors which are described in the earlier part
of this paper.237 A service provider can mount a possibly valid
challenge that these notices are inaccurate, that the mistakes made in
these notices amount to a substantive error on the part of
NBCUniversal, Marketly.com, and BPI, and as a consequence, the
service provider ought to have rejected all of the notices.
This study did not specifically set out to locate these types of
errors. And from one perspective, it could be argued that the scale of
these errors is small—only 380,379 requests out of 56,991,045 (or
0.67%) were detected in the first dataset.238 But what is alarming is the
magnitude, frequency and systematic nature of these errors, which
remained undetected and the erroneous notices repeatedly recycled for
months on end. While we may excuse these errors on the basis that they
arose from programs that are misconfigured with wrong information,
automated systems propagated these errors across hundreds and
thousands of takedown requests.239 All these seem to evidence a
“configure and forget” approach on the part of the reporters, an absence
of manual review, and a lack of rigorous oversight of the entire
takedown process and its aftermath.
A substantive error committed on arguably an even larger scale
can be seen in what this study calls the “Megaupload test.”
B. The Megaupload Test
When Megaupload and its subsidiary sites were shut down by
the U.S. government on January 19, 2012, following the indictment and

235

See supra Table 7.
See supra the discussion accompanying notes 169–177.
237
See supra the discussion accompanying notes 109–118.
238
This is the size of the original Chilling Effects dataset examined between
2009 and 2012, the first dataset. See Seng, supra note 19, at 383.
239
Another example of such an automated propagation error is where there is
a hundred-fold repetition of the same description of the same copyright
complaint in one takedown notice. See, e.g., BPI DMCA (Copyright)
Complaint to Google, CHILLING EFFECTS (May 4, 2012) (on file with author).
236
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arrests of its owners for violating copyright laws,240 it came as a real
shock to the hosting industry or cyberlockers.241 Other file hosting sites
took almost immediate steps to either limit the functionality of their
services, such as withdrawing the ability to allow their subscribers to
share links to uploaded files, or they shut down completely.242 By that
single operation, not only had the music and movie industries pulled
the plug on what was alleged to be a huge source of unlicensed
materials, they had also irrevocably changed the face of the hosting
industry.243 While some say that this has had little or no effect on piracy
because other hosting companies were quick to take the place of those
that shut down,244 other commentators noted that this has forced the
cyberlocker industry to clean up its act, including scaling back or
cancelling its affiliate programs.245 Search engines like Google

240

Jacob Ganz & Laura Sydell, Megaupload Shut Down by the FBI, NPR
(Jan. 19, 2012),
https://www.npr.org/sections/therecord/2012/01/20/145474712/megauploadshut-down-by-the-fbi.
241
See, e.g., Cecilia Kang, Megaupload Shutdown Raises New Internetsharing Fears, THE WASHINGTON POST (Jan. 20, 2012),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/megauploadshutdown-raises-new-internet-sharingfears/2012/01/20/gIQATHRtEQ_story.html.
242
See, e.g., Sami Yenigun, Other File-Sharing Sites: “We’re Not
Megaupload”, NPR (Jan 27, 2012),
https://www.npr.org/2012/01/27/145919516/other-file-sharing-sites-werenot-megaupload; John Plunkett, BTjunkie “Voluntarily” Shuts Down, THE
GUARDIAN (Feb. 6, 2012),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2012/feb/06/btjunkie-voluntarilyshutsdown#:~:text=The%20operators%20of%20BTjunkie%2C%20which,it%27s
%20time%20to%20move%20on.
243
Ernesto Van der Sar, MPAA: Megaupload Shutdown was Massive Success,
TORRENTFREAK (Dec. 5, 2012), http://torrentfreak.com/mpaa-megauploadshutdown-was-massive-success-121205/.
244
See, e.g., Elias Groll, The Feds Brought Down the World’s Biggest FileSharing Site, FOREIGN POLICY (Jul. 22, 2016),
https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/07/22/the-feds-brought-down-the-worldsbiggest-file-sharing-site/.
245
See, e.g., Sami Yenigun, Other File-Sharing Sites: “We’re Not
Megaupload”, NPR (Jan. 27, 2012),
https://www.npr.org/2012/01/27/145919516/other-file-sharing-sites-werenot-megaupload.
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voluntarily cancelled their search results for megaupload.com.246 And,
it has been claimed that, as a result, sales of licensed digital content
improved.247
Yet, more than a year after the seizure of Megaupload,
reporting agents are still submitting takedown requests for Megaupload
links.248 And, it is not just Megaupload: the data shows that other oneclick hosting companies, which have since shut down, are still targeted
through the takedown notices.
The following table shows the status of all the Megaupload
sites and various other shuttered one-click sites and hosts after the
Megaupload incident. As of the time of writing, as well as further tests
in 2019 and 2021, the sites remain inaccessible:

246

Hosting Site
megaupload.com

Date of Action
Jan. 19, 2012

Action
Closed

megapix.com

Jan. 19, 2012

Closed

megavideo.com

Jan. 19, 2012

Closed

megalive.com

Jan. 19, 2012

Closed

megabox.com

Jan. 19, 2012

Closed

megaporn.com

Jan. 19, 2012

Closed

megarotic.com

Jan. 19, 2012

Closed

sexuploader.com

Jan. 19, 2012

Closed

Ernesto Van der Sar, Google Removes ‘BitTorrent’ from Piracy Search
Filter, TORRENTFREAK (Sept. 24, 2013), http://torrentfreak.com/googleremoves-bittorrent-from-piracy-search-filter-130924/.
247
See Brett Danaher & Michael D. Smith, Gone in 60 Seconds: The Impact
of the Megaupload Shutdown on Movie Sales, SSRN (Sept. 14, 2013),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2229349.
248
Mike Masnick, Copyright Holders Still Sending DMCA Takedowns on
Content That's Been Gone for Months, TECHDIRT (Sept. 7, 2012),
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20120907/13121720312/copyright-holdersstill-sending-dmca-takedowns-content-thats-been-gone-months.shtml; AntiPiracy Outfits Think Megaupload, Demonoid & BTjunkie Are Still Alive,
TORRENTFREAK (Sept. 7, 2012), http://torrentfreak.com/anti-piracy-outfitsthink-megaupload-demonoid-btjunkie-are-still-alive-120907/.
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Hosting Site
filesonic.com

Date of Action
Jan. 22, 2012
Sep. 3, 2012

Action
Accounts and files
deleted; file sharing
capabilities disabled;249
closed250

fileserve.com

Jan. 22, 2012

Affiliates program
withdrawn; accounts
deleted; file sharing
capabilities disabled;251
DMCA complaint page
not working252

filejungle.com

Jan. 23, 2012

Affiliates program
withdrawn; file sharing
capabilities disabled253

uploadstation.com

Jan. 23, 2012

File sharing capabilities
disabled254

249
Casey Chan, FileSonic Just Killed Itself by Disabling File Sharing,
GIZMODO (Jan. 22, 2012), http://gizmodo.com/5878287/filesonic-just-killeditself-by-disabling-file-sharing; Steven Musil, FileSonic Disables File
Sharing in Wake of MegaUpload Arrests, CNET (Jan. 22, 2012),
http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-57363594-93/filesonic-disables-filesharing-in-wake-of-megaupload-arrests/.
250
Andre Yoskowitz, FileSonic Finally Shut Down for Good?, AFTERDAWN
(Sept. 3, 2012, 3:38 PM),
http://www.afterdawn.com/news/article.cfm/2012/09/03/filesonic_finally_sh
ut_down_for_good; Gunner Thorne, Filesonic.com is Offline, ONLINE FILE
STORAGE (Feb. 4, 2016),
https://web.archive.org/web/20160821095300/http://onlinefilestorage.com/fi
lesonic-com-is-offline-2129.
251
Andy Maxwell, Cyberlocker Ecosystem Shocked as Big Players Take
Drastic Action, TORRENTFREAK (Jan. 23, 2012),
http://torrentfreak.com/cyberlocker-ecosystem-shocked-as-big-players-takedrastic-action-120123/.
252
DMCA, FILESERVE, http://dmca.fileserve.com/login.php (last visited Mar.
12, 2013).
253
Maxwell, supra note 251.
254
Raptile, UploadStation.com Removes it’s [sic] Affiliate Program,
WJUNCTION.COM (Jan. 23, 2012),
https://www.wjunction.com/threads/uploadstation-com-removes-its-affiliateprogram.125422/; UPLOADSTATION.COM, http://uploadstation.com/ (since
defunct, although comparisons of uploadstation.com’s website on Wayback
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Hosting Site
x7.to

Date of Action
Jan. 23, 2012

Action
Closed255

uploadbox.com

Jan. 30, 2012

Closed256

btjunkie.org

Feb. 5, 2012

Closed257

quicksilverscreen.com

Feb. 7, 2012

Closed

wupload.com

Apr. 3, 2012

File sharing capabilities
disabled;258 domain
name is inactive—
apparently closed

demonoid.me

Jul. 25, 2012

Taken down;259 since
closed260

Table 8: List of Sites Closed After the Megaupload Takedown

Mapping this information against all the takedown requests
received between January 2011 and December 2015 in the second
dataset yields the following results:

Machine immediately before and after WJunction’s article shows the
removal of monetization links such as “Make Money,” “Redeem,” “Linking
Tools,” and “Advertising.”); see also Maxwell, supra note 251.
255
x7.to Closed, WJUNCTION.COM (Jan. 27, 2012),
https://www.wjunction.com/threads/x7-to-closed.126704/.
256
Maxwell, supra note 251.
257
See Plunkett, supra note 242.
258
Andy Maxwell, FileServe and Wupload Exit the File-Sharing Business,
TORRENTFREAK (Apr. 3, 2012), http://torrentfreak.com/fileserve-andwupload-exit-the-file-sharing-business-120403/; Andy Maxwell, We’re No
Rogue Site: PutLocker Responds to Hollywood, TORRENTFREAK (Apr. 3,
2012),
http://torrentfreak.com/were-no-rogue-site-putlocker-responds-tohollywood-120403/.
259
Emil Protalinski, Demonoid Busted by the Police, ZDNET (Aug. 6, 2012,
9:38
PM),
http://www.zdnet.com/demonoid-busted-by-the-police7000002208/.
260
Ernesto Van der Sar, Demonoid Tracker Goes Down, Again,
TORRENTFREAK (Dec. 15, 2012), http://torrentfreak.com/demonoid-trackergoes-down-again-121215/.
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Site/
Closure/
All
All
All
All
All
All
Domain Name Action requests requests requests requests requests requests
from T+I from T+2 from T+3 from T+6
from
Date (T)
from
to T+3
to T+6
to T+12 T+12 to
to T+2
T+o to
T+24
T+I
months
months
month!
months
month
months
Jan. 19,
59
135
50
565
4,9 10
1,397
mega upload
2012
Jan. 19,
megapli:
2012
Jan. 19,
megavldeo
56
110
2012
Jan. 19,
megallve
2012
Jan. 19,
megabo1
2012
Jan. 19,
I
2
megaporn
2012
Jan. 19,
megarotlc
I
I
2012
Jan. 19,
sei:uploader
2012
Jan. 23 ,
3,005
70,981
45,088
951
filejungle
5
2
201 2
Jan. 23,
uploadslatlon
412
4,606
2,243
2,538
71 ,677
96,579
2012
Jan. 23,
I
781
3,155
2,371
17.10
2012
Jan. 30,
uploadbo1
294
190
3
3
13
2012
Feb. 6,
btjunlde
2,654
902
547
607
21,459
20,428
2012
q ulcksliverFeb. 7,
12,879
30
screen
2012
Apr. I,
fileserve
21
5, 167
19,925
22 1, 139
186, 107
8,020
201 2
Apr. 3,
10,830
11,094
18,617
162,692
86,263
wupload
8,474
2012
Jul. 25,
300
319
205
481
2,367
241
demonold
2012
Sep. 3,
fllesonlc
5,523
2,78 1
5,975
133,745
40,486
468,207
2012

All
requests
from
T+12 to
T+24
month1
348

7

3
105,559
78,315
89
725
8,59 1
14
462,2 18
218,483
440
165,848

Table 9: Closed or File-sharing Disabled Sites and their “Spent” Takedown
Requests261

All in, using a generous 90-day grace period from the date of
closure of the site, 2.74 million takedown requests were served on these
disabled sites up to December 2015, not an insubstantial number.262
The information here is better viewed in the following time plot that
contrasts the takedown requests before and after the key closure/action
date of January 19, 2012.

261

Results obtained by way of a MySQL COUNT of second dataset of all
requests whose domain names are as indicated, separated into the indicated
time bands based on the date received of the notice where each request was
found. As of 2015, shaded sites/domain names were closed; unshaded
sites/domain names were still active but had disabled file sharing.
262
See supra Table 9.

2021]

COPYRIGHTING

177

Top-10 'Spent' Takedown Requests by Domain Name between 2011 and 2015

A

<'.A

,6

.J_

J
J

uploadstation.com
-,. shut down

x7.to
> shutdown

J

fileserve.com
.,. shut down

wupload.com
-,. shut down

I

,0 1;,.0 1.0 1

) 0 1~-()] .() 1

demonold.me
). shut down

A

Figure 7: Top-10 “Spent” Takedown Requests by Domain Name between
July 2011 and Dec. 2015 (weekly figures) (with shut down dates indicated
against their respective domain names)263

263

This chart is a graphical representation of Table 9; see supra Table 9.
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From these tables and plot,264 several rather surprising
observations may be made. First, notwithstanding all the concerns by
industry about how much piracy is being propagated by some of these
high profile cyberlockers such as megalive, megabox, megaporn,
megarotic and uploadbox, few or no takedown requests appear to be
targeting them, both before as well as after January 19, 2012, or at least
through Google’s takedown system in the form of notices reported in
Lumen.265 Even if it were contended that the takedown requests were
addressed directly to these hosts, it appears incongruous for the content
providers and reporters to not make a request to remove any links that
the Google search engine may have to the same content hosted by these
sites.266
However, this does not square with the second observation,
that although all these sites (and their file sharing features) are disabled,
the data shows that large numbers of takedown requests targeting these
sites are still directed through Google. In some instances, with sites like
filesonic, fileserve and wupload, takedown requests spiked after the site
has been made completely inaccessible.267 Perhaps Google still retains
cached copies of these infringing links. However, if these “dead” links
do not enable the user to access any infringing material, surely retaining
these links themselves does not constitute infringing activity.268 What
is even more extraordinary is that in some cases, such as that for
Megaupload, Google has taken down all its own links in Google Search
to Megaupload, when the site itself was seized by the U.S. government

264

See supra Table 9; see supra Figure 7.
See supra Table 9; see supra Figure 7.
266
Most reporters will advise content providers to serve takedown notices on
both cyberlockers and search engines. See How to File DMCA Takedown
Notice, PIRACYTAKEDOWN (May 1, 2014),
http://piracytakedown.com/blog/dmca-takedown-notice.
267
See supra Table 9.
268
If the links themselves do not constitute any infringing activity, identifying
and targeting them in takedown requests is a breach of 17 U.S.C. §
512(c)(3)(A)(iii), which requires the reporters to identify the material “that is
claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of infringing activity,” to which
the reporters have attested they have a “good faith belief” that such an activity
is “not authorized by the copyright owner.” 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(v). This
calls into question both whether they have actually identified the infringing
activity and their good faith belief of their identification.
265
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in January 2012.269 Yet, owners and reporters continue to serve
thousands of requests concerning Megaupload.270

269

See Cask J. Thompson, [SOPA OPERA] The Online War—The Internet
Reacts Not-So-Nicely to Megaupload Shutdown., WORDSWITHMEANING.ORG
(Jan. 20, 2012), archived at
http://web.archive.org/web/20120125211515if_/http://wordswithmeaning.or
g/2012/01/the-online-warthe-internet-reacts-not-so-nicely-to-megauploadshutdown#axzz1kVUiEAS7.
270
As of May 2015, the Lumen database shows that takedown requests are
still being directed at the defunct megavideo.com and x7.to domains. See, e.g.,
DMCA (Copyright) Complaint to Google, LUMEN (May 22, 2015),
https://www.lumendatabase.org/notices/10794321.
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I.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15 .
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23 .
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
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Reporter
Degban
BPI (British Recorded Music Industry)
Ltd*
rivendell
Recording Industry Association of
America, Inc.*
DtecNet
MarkMonitor AntiPiracy
Remove Your Media LLC
Takedown Piracy LLC
AudioLock.NET
Unidam, Inc.
Skywalker Digital, Ltd.
DMCAForce
MUSO.com Anti-piracy
IP-Echelon Pty Ltd
Fox Group Legal*
NBCUniversal*
Walt Disney Company*
Entura International Ltd
xTakedowns
Stichting BREIN*
Link-Busters.com
Marketly.com
Removeyourcontent LLC
APDIF do Brasil*

Mark Ayling
APDIF - Mexico*
Topple Track
Digimarc
Vobile Inc
APCM Mexico*

[Vol. 37

201 ,096,948
167,305,587

Total Requests
that Fail the
Megaupload test
38,226
10,898

92,020,862
69,324,907

0
291

57,534,056
55,538,930
55,097,505
49,151,664
38,961,320
29,730,630
27,417,459
24,009,736
21 ,836,365
19,539,217
17,907,645
17,370,446
13,997,165
13,776,571
13,103,134
12,596,190
I 1,208 ,365
I 1,150,221
9,533,886
9,026,362
8,781 ,121
6,959,517
6,387,034
6,303,232
5,725,773
4,925 ,087

1,078,219
389,604
539
21,193

Total Requests

0
300,225
33,988
1,017
3, 115
34
0
333,668
220
0
0
0
48 ,755
906
0
0
0
0
241
1,063
1,165
0

Table 10: Requests from Top-30 Reporters, showing Total Requests that Fail
the Megaupload test; copyright owners and industry groups marked with*271

Even if one assumes that reporting agents need some time to
“catch-up” with their infringement detection and process these
takedown requests, it would not explain why up to 90 days after these
sites are closed, takedown requests are still being issued against these

271

Results obtained by way of a MySQL COUNT of second dataset of all
requests, and requests that target the disabled sites, identifying the reporter
who sent them and grouping and sorting the reporters in descending order of
the number of all requests; reporters identified as copyright owners and
industry groups by using the Lumen database. See Lumen – About Us, supra
note 53.
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sites.272 In fact, comparing the before and after closure takedown
requests, it is patently clear that in every case, more requests were
issued against these sites after they were closed.273 Furthermore, these
erroneous requests were not limited to a few reporting agents, but were
distributed rather evenly among reporting agents, copyright owners and
their industry groups.274 That this is a totally avoidable error can be
seen by noting that the takedown requests of some of the top
reporters—APCM México, APDIF – Mexico, APDIF do Brasil,
AudioLock.NET, Entura International Ltd, Fox Group Legal,
Mark_Ayling, Removeyourcontent LLC, rivendell, Stichting BREIN
and xTakedowns, pass the Megaupload test.275 In other words, unlike
the other reporters, they sent out not a single takedown request to any
of the closed sites.
All in, 2.74 million clearly invalid takedown requests to which
every issuing reporter has attested to their accuracy were issued.276
Although these amounted to only 0.23% of all takedown requests
issued between 2011 and 2015,277 based on the sheer frequency and
repetitiveness of these errors, each and every one of these nonactionable requests is a knowing misrepresentation278 that the reporters
“should have known [about and not issued] if [they have] acted with
reasonable care or diligence or would have had no substantial doubt
had it been acting in good faith.”279
The most plausible (and most enlightening) explanation for
this serious problem is that the owners and reporting agents are looking
for infringing materials online by merely checking for the presence of
certain search terms on third party sites that collect links to such
content—aggregator sites—without verifying that the links actually
work. As one owner/reporter asserted, given the bandwidth and
processing limitations, it was not practical for the owners and reporters
to download every allegedly infringing file before issuing a takedown
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notice.280 Of course, given the increasing computational power and
bandwidth that are accessible and available, one may challenge those
assumptions in the first place. Nonetheless, owners and reporters have
asserted that notwithstanding, their automated systems “can reliably
and accurately identify content without downloading the file itself.”281
This is of course an untrue assertion because research has shown that a
not insubstantial number of the allegedly infringing files linked to by
cyberlockers sites are incorrectly categorized or password-protected,
making them inaccessible or unverifiable.282
That so many reporters have failed the Megaupload test (and
yet others have passed the same test) throws this unqualified assertion
into question. Even if these could be dismissed as programmatic
aberrations or only a reflection of a small number of all takedown
requests issued, these observations combined are troubling for a more
important reason. They call into question the care or diligence of the
reporters and their unqualified reliance on their automated processes.
They also call into question the standards applied by online service
providers and their diligence in screening and acceding to takedown
requests. Given the publicity associated with the incident, the
Megaupload test certainly suggests that the reporters actively targeted
the disabled sites and other sites that hosted links to these disabled sites
and made no distinction between the two. And it is by no means the
last. Surely other problems await further discovery. By seriously
undermining the “honor system” under which the content and online
service provider industries have so far observed, this in turn raises
larger questions as to the workings of the DMCA takedown
mechanism. With the empirical data at hand, perhaps it is time to revise
it for the better.
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Declaration of David Kaplan in Support of Warner Bros. Entertainment’s
Motion for Summary Judgment at 6, Disney Enter., Inc. v. Hotfile Corp., No
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see also Disney Enter., Inc. v. Hotfile Corp., No. 11-20427-CIV, 2013 WL
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PROPOSALS FOR REFORM

In the 21 years since its enactment, the one component of the
DMCA that has really undergone the test of time is the takedown notice
mechanism. It is the lynchpin which underlies the delicate balance of
responsibilities between the copyright owner and the online service
provider by unambiguously placing the primary responsibility for
policing the Internet on the copyright owner. In exchange, it has
afforded both large content providers as well as individual copyright
owners with an accessible and relatively cost-effective283 means to seek
the removal of infringing materials online. If the takedown mechanism
is an exercise in individual empowerment and democratization, it has
been a resounding success.
One positive change arising from the industry’s greater
experience with takedown notices has been the increasing use of
electronic forms for submitting takedown notices. The displacement of
emails in favor of web forms has all but eliminated notices with errors
like signatures and attestations.284 There is considerable room for wellimplemented web forms to detect notices that do not comply with the
functional formalities such as missing descriptions of the copyright
work or missing or inaccurate location information (the URI) for the
allegedly infringing material. As noted above, errors in functional
formalities amounting to at least 9.8% of all notices issued between
2011 and 2015 are easily correctable, as demonstrated by the use of
web forms.285 And indeed, the fact that the Lumen database has ceased
to record this information286 is an indirect testament to the fact that
errors with signatures and attestations are no longer an issue because
of well-implemented web forms and notice validation mechanisms.
However, one negative impact, which appears to stem from the
industry’s increasing reliance on automated means for detecting and
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Note that “cost effective” can be relative; smaller copyright owners such
as independent filmmakers and small recording labels may find the effort
involved in sending out high volumes of repetitive takedown notices daunting,
as well as a distraction from their actual revenue-earning work. Stephen
Carlisle, DMCA “Takedown” Notices: Why “Takedown” Should Become
“Take Down and Stay Down” and Why It’s Good for Everyone, NOVA
SOUTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY (July 23, 2014), http://copyright.nova.edu/dmcatakedown-notices/ [hereinafter Carlisle].
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See supra Table 3 and accompanying discussion.
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See supra Table 3 and accompanying discussion.
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See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
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reporting infringement, is that there are potentially large numbers of
notices with substantive errors. Between 2011 and 2015, almost 2.40
million takedown complaints have been sent which have not
documented the copyright owner of the infringed work.287 4.89 million
takedown complaints without takedown requests have been sent.288
And 2.74 million non-actionable takedown requests have been sent and
directed against defunct cyberlocker sites.289 And these numbers
merely represent the lower bound of the actual rates of substantive
errors, because there could very well be more notices that misidentify
the copyright owner, or have no takedown requests, or target defunct
sites. After all, the tests used above to illustrate the different types of
substantive errors that are possible are certainly not exhaustive.
The use of automated solutions by right holders was clearly
designed to improve human productivity in the task of reviewing the
countless online resources for possible unlicensed use.290 It cannot be
gainsaid that these takedown systems were designed to specifically
reduce human intervention.291 But, “the full benefit of these
technologies will be attained only if they are aligned with our defined
values and ethical principles.”292 Here, the values which we seek to
protect are the very values which led to the enactment of the DMCA—
to harmonize the promotion and protection of the freedom of opinion
and expression and creativity on the Internet as a human right293 with
the legitimate interests of the right holders to protect the creation and
use of such intellectual expressions. These goals are mutually
supportive.294 What this study has shown is that the use of automated
287
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solutions has been allowed to operate unchecked, and without clear
metrics to ensure their transparency and accountability to the Internet
community and to mitigate their opportunities for misuse and abuse.
It ought to be noted that these tests above certainly do not set
out to review any algorithmic shortcomings of “over-classification”—
wrongly targeting sites as hosting infringing content. Instead, the tests
focus on the human element—the failure on the part of reporters to
check and validate the input information in the notices before their
submission. As regards the misidentification of the copyright owner,
this appears to be caused by simple human error in inputting the wrong
information into the “robo-takedown” system.295 As regards the
Megaupload test, this appears to be caused by reporters who failed to
take the additional (and critical) step of verifying that the URIs in their
takedown requests actually identify material that is the subject of
infringing activity.296 Such a situation is not helped by the fact that for
many reporting agents, the number of issued takedown requests serves
as a key benchmark, if not the only benchmark, for their
remuneration.297
Three simple changes to the DMCA may however suffice to
address many of these problems. The first proposal is to make a subtle
but important change to the existing language of the DMCA to require
a reporter issuing the takedown notice, under penalty of perjury, to
attest to the accuracy of the information in the notice and its good faith
belief of its claims of copyright infringement. Currently, the DMCA
only calls for the reporter's statements of accuracy and good faith belief
without making them attestations under penalty of perjury.298 It is
clearly incongruous to only require the reporter to attest to its authority
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See supra notes 224–227 and accompanying text.
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to act and hold it to a much lesser responsibility for all other relevant
and pertinent information that it has supplied to the service provider.299
The second proposal is to provide a mechanism to require
reporters to submit verified takedown requests. This will go some way
to address not just the problem identified by the Megaupload test, but
also alter the existing practice that simply assumes a reliable and
accurate identification of the infringing content without accessing or
downloading the infringing content itself. Content owners have always
complained about the “whack-a-mole” problem wherein a disabled link
to allegedly infringing content reappears in a new link.300 The
Megaupload test suggests that this “whack-a-mole” problem may be
less intractable than the content owners have suggested, because a notinsignificant number of these links to allegedly infringing content may
be non-functional links after all.
Of course, it may be argued that removing these non-functional
links harms no one—not the content provider, and certainly not an
information location service provider like Google. This is not true. The
service provider’s resources that could otherwise be deployed to more
carefully process the functional links will be diverted to process the
non-functional links. In addition, a reporter that targets sites that host
non-functional links is also wasting its own resources to no end. It is
only in the copyright owner’s interest to target the functional links;
removing non-functional links from a search engine only helps the
pirating-end user by making his searches more precise and more likely
to be fruitful.
This may be achieved by revising the formal requirement in
section 512(c)(3)(A)(iii) of the DMCA to require a reporter to verify
the takedown URIs and the dates of verification. In practical terms, this
would require the reporter to attempt to access the URIs pertaining to

299
That it is clearly incongruous can be illustrated by the fact that some judges
make the mistake of reading the penalty of perjury to apply to both the
statement of authorization and the statement of good faith belief. See Perfect
10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1112 (9th Cir. 2007) (“The DMCA
requires a complainant to declare, under penalty of perjury, that he is
authorized to represent the copyright holder, and that he has a good-faith belief
that the use is infringing.”).
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the takedown request.301 Testing the URI as opposed to actually
downloading the resource referred to in the URI is less bandwidth
intensive, can be done quickly and efficiently, and is better than the
current industry practice of not requiring any download or review of
the targeted content before the takedown notice is issued.302 By
requiring reporters to indicate if they have validated the URI as
“information reasonably sufficient to permit the service provider to
locate the material,”303 this amendment reasserts the need for
contemporaneity as an aspect of accuracy in takedown requests. In
most instances, particularly the small copyright authors, they would
have taken this obvious step already, and so this would not impose any
additional reporting burdens on these author-reporters. In fact, some
reporters already provide this information voluntarily,304 and so turning
this into a mandatory requirement levels the playing field for all
reporters.
The third proposal calls for a mechanism to place a “cost”—a
binding disincentive—on reporters for submitting bad or erroneous
takedown requests. In the rush to stem the tide of piracy and in the
absence of penalties for making “false positive” takedown requests,
reporters have tended to file takedown requests which a judge has
described in one case as “overzealous and overreaching.”305 If the
marginal price of each arrow is near zero, to improve his chances, the
reporter will fire off as many arrows as he can to hit a target, regardless
of the accuracy or precision. But with thousands of reporters doing the
same thing, there is a real danger that their actions will either bring a
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If the URI cannot be accessed, the HTTP will return an error code, or
indicate if the URI has been redirected to some other URI. The former shows
that the URI is inaccessible, and the latter allows the reporter to target the
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sites when their systems detect that they are being probed by systems owned
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legitimate but targeted online service provider to its knees,306 or
compromise and cause it to conduct minimal review of these
submissions. Courts are beginning to recognize these dangers by ruling
that the issuance of numerous defective takedown notices may be
grounds for the recipient service provider to mount an action for
knowing misrepresentation under section 512(f).307 Yet the
jurisprudence in this area is relatively untested and the service provider
may find it difficult to surmount the requirement to prove damages.308
A better solution then is to create a two-tier system for
handling takedown requests: a normal tier for most takedown requests,
and a “slow lane” for handling takedown requests from specific
reporters who have been responsible for the most egregiously bad
requests. In other words, the penalty for submitting erroneous
takedown requests is that they will be given lower priority and handled
more slowly than most other requests. Most online service providers
already track takedown submissions for each reporter,309 and so the
groundwork has already been laid for the implementation of this
solution. As earlier mentioned,310 Google has in a documented instance
withdrawn two reporters from its TCRP.311 Various criteria can be used
to determine when a reporter will be brought within the “slow lane”
class of reporters. For instance, the error rates of requests submitted by
reporters could be tracked, and the top 10% of reporters with the
highest weekly moving average error rates that exceed a stipulated
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error rate of, say, 5%, will fall into the “slow lane.” Such a system will
not discriminate against the small copyright owner or first-time
reporter, because the moving average error rate will be assessed over,
say, a substantive period of 6 months. Nor is the system necessarily
stacked against the largest users of the takedown system by volume of
takedown requests, because it is possible to issue large volumes of
takedown requests and have low error rates, as the empirical studies
above have shown. And to ensure that the criteria will not be used by
service providers to serve as a shield from processing takedown
requests, it could also be provided that the two-tier system could only
be introduced by online service providers who can prove that they
receive more than a certain threshold by volume of takedown notices.
Admittedly, this two-tier system with its “accountability
metrics”312 will not be popular with content providers. But introducing
a benchmark setting measure will help ensure better verified notices,
lower the incidents of “false positive” takedown requests, promote
accountability of reporters to right holders and to service providers,
raise the overall standards for reporters and encourage a “race to the
top.” This will in turn reduce the incidents of indiscriminate and
“whack-a-mole” takedowns and encourage the development of more
precise technologies for detecting and reporting online infringements
which are less likely to generate false positives, and are more measured
and nuanced when compared to the takedown-and-stay-down
mechanism. After all, the use of value-based design methodologies is
a hallmark of good engineering, as it attempts to capture and codify
societal well-being, social costs and overall economic value into
metrics which can be empirically evaluated by oversight systems for
compliance.313 And such methodologies could even serve as the
prelude for an industry wide technical solution which can definitively
address the problems of the proliferation of unlicensed works, a
solution which has hitherto not been explored though it has been
embedded in the DMCA.314
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CONCLUSION
If a history of the DMCA is ever to be written, one of its most
defining moments will be when copyright owners and reporters started
to use automated solutions to detect instances of copyright
infringement and submit takedown notices and their requests to the
service providers. This is perfectly understandable. As online piracy
proliferates, we have to use automated solutions to find, manage and
contain this serious problem. Conversely, the opportunities for human
intercession have been reduced. But this is not to say that human input
is less important. On the contrary, human input is vital because it
shapes the way we design our automated systems and the results we
want from them.
Unfortunately, for takedown notices this interaction between
human review and automated processing has broken down. It has
created a situation where erroneous notices that fail to comply with
non-functional formalities like electronic signatures and attestations
are (almost) non-existent, because these procedural elements can be
purely automated. But where there is ostensibly human input, there are
a substantial number of notices (5.5%) between 2011 and 2015 that fail
to properly comply with the functional formalities such as having a
description of the copyrighted work.315 Likewise, the significant
number of notices with empty takedown requests (9.8%) or a smaller
but not insignificant number of improperly validated takedown
requests (0.23%) again show a systemic failure on the part of the
reporters to properly configure their takedown programs.316
We may condone some mistakes, particularly mistakes which
are innocent and reasonable. But we ought to impose penalties for
mistakes and escalate them into liabilities against the reporting agents
where these mistakes were caused by the unreasonable behavior of the
reporters.317 These errors were never caught for months on end. We
cannot, and should not, allow parties to elude responsibility, just
because they use machines to extend their decision making
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capabilities.318 For this reason, we have to expose as completely
facetious the argument that the reporter is not responsible for its
computers as “computers conducting automated searches cannot form
a belief consistent with the language of the DMCA, because they
cannot distinguish between infringing content and content that merely
contains words that suggest infringement.”319 In truth, it is the reporters
who are responsible—the same reporters who, in the quest for speed
and efficiency, have arrogated their individual human responsibilities
to the programmers and their codes and scripts.320 They have, through
the largely automated mechanism of the DMCA, enabled the illicit
enforcement of copyrights—a “copywrong.”321 Surely this calls for
greater scrutiny of their takedown processes, and not less.
In today’s increasingly automated world, although machines
have taken over much of the mundane and repetitive tasks to which we
318
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used to apply manual labor, there is still much we can do. We commend
the Internet intermediaries and the operators of the then-Chilling
Effects—and now Lumen—repository, who believe that transparency
is one of the best ways to ensure accountability for online decisions.
Let us build upon their efforts, systematically evaluate and review these
takedown notices, put a stop to these errors and hold the reporters to a
higher standard. Let us translate the lessons we have learnt from this
study to develop an improved takedown system: one that promotes
openness and transparency, encourages the development of standards,
invites competitive innovations and demonstrates better accountability.
Let us end this process of copyrighting copywrongs.

